I ask my Advanced Business Associations students to recognize and process theory and policy and relate them to doctrine at the practical level.  This is, as most of you will recognize, a tall order of business for students who have just recently learned what business associations law is and may not yet (at the time they take the course) have applied the law in a practical context outside the classroom.  (The course is open to 2L and 3L students who have already taken Business Associations.)

So, when it came time to lionize my friends Lyman Johnson and David Millon at a symposium honoring their work (which, as you may recall, I first heralded on the BLPB a year ago and wrote a bit about back in October), I decided to put my scholarship pen (keyboard) where my teaching mouth is.  My goal for the symposium was to write something that linked theory and policy through doctrine to law practice and, at the same time, incorporated Lyman’s and David’s work. The essay I produced in fulfillment of these objectives was recently released and posted to SSRN.  I excerpted from it in my post on Saturday.  The full SSRN abstract follows.

In context, corporate law is often credited with creating, hewing to, or reinforcing a shareholder wealth maximization norm. The now infamous opinion in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. describes the norm in a relatively bald and narrow way: “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” As a matter of theory and policy, commentators from the academy (law and business) and practice (lawyers and judges) have taken various views on this asserted norm—ranging from characterizing the norm as nonexistent or oversimplified to maintaining it as simple fact.

In an effort to broaden the conversation about the shareholder wealth maximization norm in an applied context, this essay describes shareholder wealth maximization under various state laws (in and outside Delaware) as a function of firm-level corporate governance—corporate law statutes, decisional law interpreting and filling gaps in that statutory law, and corporate charter and bylaw provisions—as applicable to both publicly held and privately held corporations in a variety of states. In this overall context, the essay considers the possibility that holders of shares in for-profit corporations may desire to maximize overall utility in their shareholdings of a particular firm, rather than merely the financial wealth arising from those holdings. To accomplish its purpose, the essay first briefly and generally addresses shareholder wealth maximization as a function of applicable statutory and decisional law and as a matter of private ordering (collecting, synthesizing, and characterizing, in each case, points made in the extant literature) before suggesting the broad implications of that analysis for corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization and concluding. Ultimately, the essay makes a case for a more nuanced look at the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Given differences in doctrine and public policy among the states and variance in that doctrine and public policy among public, private, and statutory close or closely held corporations within individual states, answers to open questions are likely to (and should) depend on individualized facts assessed through the lens of specific statutory and decisional law and applicable public policy.

I fear that this short piece does not do the subject (or Lyman and David’s amazing work) justice.  But my biggest regret is that the essay went to press without the addition of thanks to two special folks in my author’s footnote.  I want to call those two colleagues out here.  

Continue Reading Shareholder Wealth Maximization at the Firm Level

Loyalty has been in the news lately.  The POTUS, according to some reports, asked former Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Director James Comey to pledge his loyalty.  Assuming the basic veracity of those reports, was the POTUS referring to loyalty to the country or to him personally?  Perhaps both and perhaps, as Peter Beinart avers in The Atlantic, the POTUS and others fail to recognize a distinction between the two.  Yet, identifying the object of a duty can be important.

I have observed that the duty of government officials is not well understood in the public realm. Donna Nagy’s fine work on this issue in connection with the proposal of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (“STOCK”) Act, later adopted by Congress, outlines a number of ways in which Congressmen and Senators, among others, may owe fiduciary duties to others.  If you have not yet been introduced to this scholarship, I highly recommend it.  If we believe that government officials are entrusted with information, among other things, in their capacity as public servants, they owe duties to the government and its citizens to use that information in authorized ways for the benefit of that government and those citizens.  In fact, Professor Nagy’s congressional testimony as part of the hearings on the STOCK Act includes the following in this regard:

Given the Constitution’s repeated reference to public offices being “of trust,” and Members’ oath of office to “faithfully discharge” their duties, I would predict that a court would be highly likely to find that Representatives and Senators owe fiduciary-like duties of trust and confidence to a host of parties who may be regarded as the source of material nonpublic congressional knowledge. Such duties of trust and confidence may be owed to, among others:

  • the citizen-investors they serve;
  • the United States;
  • the general public;
  • Congress, as well as the Senate or the House;
  • other Members of Congress; and
  • federal officials outside of Congress who rely on a Member’s loyalty and integrity.

There is precious little in federal statutes, regulations, and case law on the nature–no less the object–of any fiduciary the Director of the FBI may have.  The authorizing statute and regulations provide little illumination.  Federal court opinions give us little more.  See, e.g., Banks v. Francis, No. 2:15-CV-1400, 2015 WL 9694627, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-1400, 2016 WL 110020 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016) (“Plaintiff does not identify any specific, mandatory duty that the federal officials — Defendants Hornak, Brennan, and the FBI Director— violated; he merely refers to an overly broad duty to uphold the U.S. Constitution and to see justice done.”).  Accordingly, any applicable fiduciary duty likely would arise out of agency or other common law.  Section 8.01 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency provides “An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connect with the agency relationship.”  

But who is the principal in any divined agency relationship involving the FBI Director?  

Continue Reading Loyalty to Whom (or What)?

In last week’s post, I mentioned Dr. Steven Garber. Recently, I finished his 2014 book Visions of Vocation: Common Grace for the Common Good. This book is among a handful of  books in the faith & work area that I have read over the past few months.

Visions of Vocation is beautifully written, lyrical and rich. Garber’s weaves philosophy, literature, and personal stories throughout the book’s 255 pages.

Garber’s thesis in this talk, which echoes in much of his work, is that “vocation is integral, not incidental to the Missio Dei (mission of God).” Garber says the book Visions of Vocation grew out of these questions: Can you know the world and still love the world? & What will you do with what you know? The first question hits home, as the flaws of jobs and people often become more vivid over time.  After the second question, Garber shows how stoicism and cynicism are unsatisfying responses.  

Garber offers no easy answers, which is, perhaps, on purpose. These are difficult questions in a difficult area, and easy answers may not exist. I finished the book still hoping for some clear principles for integrating faith and work, but maybe the stirring questions were the point. The stories of folks at International Justice Mission and Elevation Burger, among others, do help in thinking about how faith and work fit together, as do the references to Walker Percy and Wendell Berry.

Again, this is not a book that provides a few simple steps or quick takeaways, but for a number of days after finishing it, I am still pondering its contents. For that reason, I think the book was well worth reading.

I try to watch at least one Ted Talk a day. I learn new substantive topics and I also learn from listening to the speakers break down complex topics in an engaging way–a key skill for the classroom. I don’t know that any of the videos in a recent article written for business people really transformed my thinking about business, but I did find some parts interesting and inspiring.

Here they are for your viewing pleasure:

This past week was a big one for loyalty stories.  First, we have the New York Times reporting that President Trump asked former FBI director James Comey for his pledge of loyalty, to which Comey apparently promised “honesty.”  (The White House disputes this report.) 

Then, we have a high school quarterback in Illinois being forced to decommit from the University of Wisconsin’s, apparently because he tweeted that the University of Georgia had offered him a scholarship.  The student called Wisconsin Coach Budmayr, telling him he had the offer and said he was “still 100% committed to the Badgers.” The next day Budmayr apparently told him that he was no longer a good fit for Wisconsin and that he should keep looking.  The reason: lack of loyalty.  

Obviously, I only have the facts as they have been portrayed in these articles, and there are two sides to every story.  Nonetheless, these anecdotes got me to thinking about loyalty and how people tend to perceive the concept. 

To some, loyalty means fidelity.  This can be in the physical or emotional sense, as in the marriage context.  Some view extend it to ideological loyalty.  And to some, it means undying, uncompromising agreement and support.  It is this last idea that troubles me, because often it means that the loyalty is misguided. 

Merriam-Webster dictionary defines loyal as follows:

1. unswerving in allegiance: such a

a :  faithful in allegiance to one’s lawful sovereign or government were loyal to the king    

b:  faithful to a private person to whom faithfulness is due a loyal husband

 c :  faithful to a cause, ideal, custom, institution, or product a loyal churchgoer

2. showing loyalty a loyal friend

3. obsolete :  lawful, legitimate

The Trump-Comey scenario is clearly type 1(a), but I think the same is true of the Badger football situation. The concept of requiring absolute loyalty to the cause as a prerequisite for being part of the team.  

The problem, of course, is what it means to be faithful and to whom.  In the Comey situation, Comey’s loyalty is to the FBI, the country, and the truth, not the person in the White House. Trump has sort of acknowledged this, although it is not clear what the president had in mind if he really did ask Comey for such a pledge.  But it is clear that if Comey were to have pledged loyalty to the president, he would clearly have created the risk of compromising his loyalty to the country and the truth.  

For football, this is harder to define.  Is it to the team?  To the coach? To the other players?  To the program?  Everything? 

Blind allegiance is rarely a good thing, and can often lead to bad outcomes.  In the Badger football case, it seems the coach was either (a) looking to get out of the commitment and took an excuse, (b) really believes assurances from one of his commits are hollow, or (c) wanted to send a message about allegiance.  It is entirely possible it was some combination of the three. 

When it comes to the high school player, I can imagine a scenario where the player was excited to be pursued, and he was showing off a little.  Hard to blame a kid for that, frankly.  Despite assurances to the contrary, the Badger coach wanted none of it.  His team, his call, but I don’t like it. 

In my view, loyalty runs two ways.  And loyalty should have room for misunderstandings, at a minimum, if not mistakes. Even it it doesn’t, in the case of college player and college coach, the coach is the grown up.  He or she should act like it.  That means, if you have a real problem with the player, state it. And if you really don’t want them any more, say it.  I have no idea what the coach said, and in fairness to him, he may be the one taking the high road here by not airing issues publicly. 

I can’t say these stories raise any clear answers for me.  But they do raise questions about loyalty, and what it means.  I think that’s worth thinking about, especially for lawyers and future lawyers. Both of these stories make me uncomfortable. It’s worth it to me to think about why and what that means. And I think we should all spend a little time thinking about it. 

Today, I am spending my birthday attending and presenting at the Fifth Annual Midwest Symposium on Social Entrepreneurship in Kansas City, Missouri.  I owe my presence here to my entrepreneurship colleagues and friends Tony Luppino (UMKC Law) and John Tyler (Kauffman Foundation).  Thanks for the awesome birthday present, guys.

There’s so much I have to say about just the first day of this event.  (I also will be here and presenting tomorrow.)  The proceedings so far have been incredibly thought-provoking and instructive.  Most intriguing has been the focus around creating an ecosystem for social entrepreneurship.  Of course, law and lawyers have roles in that.  Hence, this blog post . . . .

Specifically, I want to devote today’s post to the four essential action-elements necessary to generate a successful, sustained future for social entrepreneurship as posited and described by Mark Beam, Maverick in Residence at the Kauffman Foundation, in his kick-off keynote presentation this morning.  (As an aside, I will note that Mark started his talk with a brief recounting of the origin of the word “maverick,” which was independently fascinating.)  Here are Mark’s four elements, as I captured them in my notes (likely imperfectly), together with a bit of summary definitional commentary.  He contended that, to build a sustainable ecosystem for social entrepreneurship, we must:

  1. Redefine work (recognizing entrepreneurship as work; taking into account the power and effects of technology, but knowing it needs to serve us and the human potential)
  2. Nurture entrepreneurial ecosystems that mimic and integrate natural systems (e.g., helping people to help themselves; moving resources from the “haves” to the “have-nots”)
  3. Evolve our capacity to serve more of the entrepreneurial community through ecosystem design (referring to three megatrends outlined by Kauffman Foundation CEO Wendy Guillies–demography, geography, and technology; opening up entrepreneurship to all to increase business, start-ups employment, productivity)
  4. Tell new stories (relating anecdotes that connect us; “we create the future through the stories we tell ourselves”—visioning the future through stories)

That may not sound like much, but trust me.  The talk (beautifully delivered with amazing graphics, photography, and media content) was much better than my quick summary of the outtakes.

What Mark said made a lot of sense to me based on my related experience and work.  But I found myself thinking about the role of the lawyer in these action items.  How can lawyers–especially business lawyers–who support social enterprise help social entrepreneurship to productively move forward?

Continue Reading Creating a More Productive Space for Social Entrepreneurship – A Unique Birthday Present

Joshua Fershee started a conversation about incompetent male leaders, so in keeping with that theme, here are a couple of other interesting data points.

First, a new study shows that male loan officers are more willing to lend money to other men – especially men they bond with.  (Bloomberg story here; paper here).  That doesn’t work out so well for the banks; these loans are more likely to default.  Women loan officers do not suffer from the same bias.

Second, another study shows that male analysts are biased in favor of male CEOs – again, an effect that doesn’t hold for women.  (WSJ story here; paper here).

The critical point, for me, is that these biases exist even though they are unprofitable (in short term thinking, anyway; they may be very profitable for men as a group, long term).  It’s an obvious point but it bears repeating:  prejudice resists evidence.  The market cannot cure problems that prejudice bars it from perceiving.

As for why women do not, in these studies, suffer from the same bias (or do not suffer to the same degree), it’s not that women are especially rational as compared to men; it’s simply that, to quote the immortal philosopher, Douglas Adams:

It is difficult to be sat on all day, every day, by some other creature, without forming an opinion about them. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to sit all day, every day, on top of another creature and not have the slightest thought about them whatsoever.