Although it may have gotten a bit lost in the shuffle of the POTUS’s first ten days in office, the nomination of Representative Tom Price for the post of Secretary of Health and Human Services has received some negative attention in the press.  In short, as reported by a variety of news outlets (e.g., here and here and here), some personal stock trading transactions have raised questions about whether Representative Price may have inappropriately used information or his position to profit personally from securities trading activities, in violation of applicable ethical or legal rules.  This post offers some preliminary insights about the nature of the concerns, which are set forth in major part in this New York Times editorial from January 18, and joins others in calling for reform.

Concerns about legislators’ securities trading activities are not new.  As you may recall, a 2011 study (using data from 1985-2001) found that members of the U.S. House of Representatives do make abnormal returns on stock trades.  A 60 Minutes exposé, “Insiders,” then followed, which helped catalyze the adoption in 2012 of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (“STOCK”) Act.  A recently released paper catalogues this history and effects on those abnormal returns.  The findings in this paper, which focuses on Senate trading transactions, are summarized below.

Before “Insiders” aired, the market-value weighted hedged portfolio earns an annualized abnormal return of 8.8%. This abnormal return comes entirely from the sell-side of the portfolio, which earns an annualized 16.77% abnormal return. Post-60 Minutes, we find no evidence of continued outperformance in our market-value weighted portfolios. On average, abnormal returns to the market-value weighted sell portfolio are 24% lower post-60 Minutes, relative to the pre-60 Minutes sample. Taken together, our evidence suggests that, Senators, on the whole, outperformed the market pre-60 Minutes, and this systematic outperformance did not survive the attention paid to Senators’ investments surrounding the broadcast of “Insiders” and subsequent passage of the Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act.

Continue Reading Public Officials And Securities Investments – A Parade of Horribles?

I’ve previously posted about Delaware’s vulnerability – namely, to the extent it tries to police shareholder litigation through procedural rather than substantive legal standards, it is vulnerable to losing disputes to other jurisdictions that have rules deemed more favorable by litigants.  Plaintiffs and defendants can reach sweetheart merger settlements in jurisdictions that examine the terms less searchingly; defendants can win a dismissal of all claims filed by weak plaintiffs in one jurisdiction and estop stronger plaintiffs who bring suit in Delaware.

So, for example, Delaware encourages derivative plaintiffs to seek books and records under Section 220 before bringing a lawsuit, but that takes time.  A plaintiff in another jurisdiction might simply file a lawsuit right away, and if that suit is dismissed, the dismissal can preclude the Delaware plaintiff– which only gives the Delaware plaintiff less incentive to seek books and records in the first place.

Well, until now.  In Cal. State Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 2017 WL 239364 (Del. 2017), that exact scenario occurred in the long-running action against Wal-Mart for violations of the foreign corrupt practices act in Mexico.  While the Delaware plaintiffs sought books and records to bolster a derivative claim, federal plaintiffs in Arkansas ploughed ahead using public information, only to see their suit dismissed for failure to plead demand futility.  And Delaware Chancery concluded that the Arkansas ruling was res judicata against the Delaware plaintiffs.

Not so fast, said the Delaware Supreme Court last week.  Following VC Laster’s analysis in In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Deriv. Litig., 130 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2016), the Supreme Court expressed concern that, as a matter of constitutional due process, until demand futility is established, any single group of plaintiffs represents only its own interests, and not the interests of the corporation.  Therefore, they bind only themselves – not the corporation – in any litigation, and a dismissal of one claim cannot preclude a subsequent claim.

The Court did not so hold definitively, though; it simply remanded to Chancery for further consideration of the issue.

This is certainly a dramatic solution to the problem of multiforum shareholder litigation.  Prior proposals have suggested a more searching inquiry into the adequacy of the first plaintiff; this approach, however, would mean that in derivative actions, no plaintiff is ever precluded by another plaintiff’s failure to plead demand futility.  Talk about firing off a canon to kill a bug.

It still leaves Delaware in a precarious position, because it rests wholly on federal constitutional law – and there’s no telling how federal judges will rule once they get hold of the problem.  They certainly don’t have the same interests in protecting Delaware law that Delaware has.

The Star Trek copyright lawsuit I previously wrote about settled last Friday.  This was not a surprise. Defendant Axanar’s best bet was arguing that its fan film made fair use of the Star Trek works. The court, however, foreclosed that defense a few weeks ago.  This post addresses a few points (out of many) from the opinion ruling against Axanar’s assertion of fair use.  I’m not certain that the judge got the multi-factor analysis incorrect, but I do worry about how some aspects of the opinion will be applied in the future. 

When assessing fair use, courts must review whether the work is commercial or not.  For-profit use weighs against the defense.  Axanar argued that its film was non-commercial because it would be freely downloadable.  The court rebuffed, positing that “indirect commercial benefit” is sufficient to render a use commercial. While there is precedent supporting this proposition, the opinion expanded the idea of indirect commercial benefit a step too far. 

The court held that defendants’ intent to create “other job opportunities” through the Axanar project rendered it commercial and thus, disfavored fair use.  The problem is that almost any author, film producer, etc. hopes that their projects will be successful and create future job prospects.  Accordingly, this consideration will disfavor fair use in almost all situations under the Axanar opinion. 

To be fair, there was evidence that defendants attempted to leverage their project into new business opportunities, and that probably supports the “commercial” determination. This fact, however, was not elaborated on in the opinion, and that nuance is unlikely to be referenced in future citations to the case.   

My second concern with the fair use analysis pertains to the court’s assessment of the “Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used.” Under this factor, the more of the copyrighted work that is used (in both volume and importance), the less likely the defense is applicable. The court found that Axanar’s use of many details from the Star Trek universe (e.g., Vulcans, phasers, etc.) disfavored fair use.  There was no discussion of whether Axanar used primary plots or characters from Star Trek.

This precedent again casts broad shadows. Under the opinion, stories that take place in a preexisting fictional world (e.g., fan works) will almost always be disfavored as a fair use (regardless of how much of the actual plot is used).  Works of that type commonly use small details to stay consistent with the original universe, and thus, under the Axanar opinion, will usually be disfavored as a fair use.  I doubt the court intended the “amount used” consideration to disfavor fair use for almost all works of this nature (including most fan productions).  Again, while the court’s final conclusion may be correct, the precedent it established seems to be unnecessarily broad.

Many, if not most, law professors teach their students the IRAC framework — Issue – Rule – Analysis – Conclusion — to use in addressing legal issues and answering exam essays.

I even teach my undergraduate students the IRAC framework, and find it useful in teaching critical thinking skills.

However, like many of my former law professors, I usually underemphasize the importance of the conclusion. Of course you have to get the issue and rule correct to start, but the meat of the answer is in the fact and rule-based analysis. The conclusion, I often say, can often go either way, especially on the thorny exam issues.

Since I started hearing the term “post truth,” I have been rethinking the way I teach IRAC and the underemphasized conclusion. While it is still clearly important to teach and test analysis, I am starting to realize the value of identifying the strongest and best conclusion. This may prove difficult to test, as law exams often focus on unsettled areas of law, but perhaps I will include a few more settled portions to see if students can identify legal issues with a clearer correct answer.  

The Belmont Health Law Journal is hosting its first symposium tomorrow, January 27th.

The theme of the symposium will be What’s Next? The Movement from Volume to Value-based Healthcare Delivery, and will feature Congressman Jim Cooper as keynote speaker. 

Information is available here.

Registration is from 8:30am to 9:00am. Speakers will present from 9:00 am until noon. CLE credit and lunch provided.

Spoiler alert:  wrongful refusal of demand and bad faith standards are the same in recent Delaware Court of Chancery case: Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., C.A. No. 11816-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017, Op by VC Montgomery-Reeves).  

But sometimes a reminder that the law is the same and can be clearly stated is worth a blog post in its own right.  Professors can use this as a hypo or case note and those in the trenches can update case citations to a 2017 (and 2016) case.

In Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., VC Montgomery-Reeves dismissed a derivative suit, holding that plaintiff did not prove wrongful refusal of pre-suit demand.  The derivative action claimed that the Mattel board of directors refused to bring suit to recover up to $11.5 million paid in severance/consulting fees to the former chairman and chief executive officer who left in the wake of a falling stock price. Plaintiff challenged disclosure discrepancies over whether Stockton resigned or was terminated and the resulting entitlement to severance payments.  Mattel’s board of directors unanimously rejected the demand after consultation with outside counsel, 24 witness interviews and a review of approximately 12,400 documents.

The relied upon case law is unchanged, but the clear recitation of the law is worth noting:

Where, as here, a plaintiff makes demand on the board of directors, the plaintiff concedes that the board is disinterested and independent for purposes of responding to the demand. The effect of such concession is that the decision to refuse demand is treated as any other disinterested and independent decision of the board—it is subject to the business judgment rule. Accordingly, the only issues the Court must examine in analyzing whether the board’s demand refusal was proper are “the good faith and reasonableness of its investigation. (internal citations omitted)

To successfully challenge the good faith and reasonableness of the board’s investigation, Plaintiff’s complaint was required to state particularized facts raising a reasonable doubt that: 

(1) the board’s decision to deny the demand was consistent with its duty of care to act on an informed basis, that is, was not grossly negligent; or (2) the board acted in good faith, consistent with its duty of loyalty. Otherwise, the decision of the board is entitled to deference as a valid exercise of its business judgment.

First, Plaintiff challenged the board’s demand refusal on the grounds that they did not disclose the investigation report or the supporting documents in conjunction with the demand refusal.  The Court was unpersuaded given that Plaintiff had the right to seek the report and records through a Section 220 demand, but chose not to do so.

Second, Plaintiff challenged the board’s demand refusal on the grounds that it failed to form a special committee. Absent any facts that the Mattel board considering the demand was not independent, there was no requirement for the board to form a special committee.

Third, and final, Plaintiff challenged the board’s good faith in rejecting the demand on the grounds that Stockton’s employment was not voluntarily terminated. The court cautioned that:

[T]he question is not whether the [b]oard’s conclusion was wrong; the question is whether the [b]oard intentionally acted in disregard of [Mattel’s] best interests in deciding not to pursue the litigation the Plaintiff demanded. [T]he fact that the [b]oard’s justifications for  refusing [the] demand fall within ‘the bounds of reasonable judgment’ is fatal to [the] claim that the refusal was made in bad faith. (citing to Friedman v. Maffei, (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2016))

Francis Pileggi at the excellent Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog first brought this case to my attention.  Practitioners and Professors alike should be certain to include his blog on your weekly round up.  He is a sure source of concise and insightful summaries of the latest Delaware court developments.  

-Anne Tucker

Friend and co-blogger Marcia Narine Weldon sent me a news article from Alaska discussing a “piercing of the corporate veil” claim for an LLC.  

The City and Borough of Juneau demolished the Gastineau Apartments and is trying to get hold members of Gastineau Apartments LLC, apparent owners of the building liable for the $1.4 million demolition costs. Demolition cost more than the land is worth, so the suit is seeking to have the owners of the LLC, Camilla and James Barrett, pay the bill because they missed deadlines to repair or demolish the property.

 

The article reports:

At issue before Juneau Superior Court Judge Philip Pallenberg is the legal concept of “piercing the corporate veil.” It would allow legal action against the Barretts, who controlled Gastineau Apartments LLC.

Defense Attorney Robert Spitzfaden had argued that the Barretts should remain shielded from liability. But the judge noted that the defendants had allowed their limited liability corporation to be dissolved after missing filing deadlines with the state.

“It’s clear that the Barretts were not always clear to observe the formal legal requirements of their LLC,” Judge Pallenberg said from the bench.

A quick review of Alaska LLC law did not make clear to me that LLCs in the state have formal requirements that would be implicated in this case.  If the main reason that the LLC did not pay the bills was a mere lack of money, there is no reason to pierce the veil. It’s just a failed venture.  Sure, the Barretts should have gone followed the appropriate processes, but it cannot be that the fact that the Barretts “allowed their limited liability corporation [author’s note: it’s an LLC] to be dissolved after missing filing deadlines with the state” is sufficient to support veil piercing.”  

Imagine the same scenario, but the building had value. Would missing deadlines and allowing the land owned by LLC to be automatically transferred to the Barretts?  Even if there were other creditors?  I think not.  

Perhaps there is more to this case than the article reveals, but this looks a lot like a lack of entity funds is the only issue, and a lack of funds (on its own) should not be sufficient for veil piercing, especially in a property case where the property can be forfeited.  If the city or state wants to make a law making individuals liable, then fine, but this looks like a bad case for veil piercing and a possible summary judgment case. I look forward to seeing if Alaska analyzes this one right at trial.  

Just a quick post today to alert you to a new teaching text that you may want to consider if you teach business planning or another similar offering focusing on transactional business law.  My UT Law colleagues George Kuney, Brian Krumm, and Donna Looper are coauthors of the recently released teaching text, A Transactional Matter.  The description on amazon.com follows.

A Transactional Matter gives users a summary of a basic transaction from initial choice of entity for a new venture through the harvest of that venture through a sale of substantially all its assets to an acquirer. This book allows students to get a feel for how transactional lawyering actually works―examining client objectives, legal options, client counseling, due dilligence, documentation and implementation.

This book is available in both a print version and electronic version. The e-version has live hyperlinks to the underlying transactional documents and statutes, regs, and cases. The print version will be supported by a website giving access to the same materials. Both the e-book and website of print version will feature extensive hyperlinks to source documents and legal authorities.

The three coauthors bring to this book a wealth of business law experience in a variety of contexts (from bankruptcy to general practice).   Overall, the book represents a very accessible set of teaching materials.  In fact, a student in my transaction simulation course module (which focuses on bylaw drafting) has already posted an excerpt to our class website, showing the immediate value of the text to my students (and maybe yours . . .).  If you use the book, please let me know how and how it worked for you.

[FYI, my colleagues also are coauthors of A Civil Matter, a civil procedure/litigation introduction for 1L students, in case that’s more up your alley.]

[Added 1/24/2017: Here is the link to the West Academic page that Jeff Lipshaw mentions in his comment, for those who are interested.]