Although I knew that Labor Day was a creation of the labor movement (about which I have mixed views), I had never looked up the history of the holiday in the United States.  The Department of Labor, unsurprisingly, has a nifty, short webpage with some nice historical facts.  Among them: the holiday has roots back into the 1880s and was originally a municipal creation, then became a state holiday in a number of states before Congress approved the holiday in 1894.  The brief history on the webpage concludes with the following paragraph:

The vital force of labor added materially to the highest standard of living and the greatest production the world has ever known and has brought us closer to the realization of our traditional ideals of economic and political democracy. It is appropriate, therefore, that the nation pay tribute on Labor Day to the creator of so much of the nation’s strength, freedom, and leadership — the American worker.

Great stuff.  

Labor and employment lawyers have focused commentary over the past week on legal matters relating to their spheres of influence in acknowledging Labor Day.  Proskauer partner Mark Theodore posted a piece on a pair of recent NLRB decisions, and a union commentator, executive director of the Center for Union Facts, posted an advocacy piece promoting proposed federal legislation–the Employee Rights Act (which, according to the article, is “legislation which would protect employees from out-of-touch union bosses.”).  

All of this may be of interest to business lawyers.  Or it may not.  But tomorrow, I will honor the holiday by working–at least for part of the day.  And that does seem, somehow, fitting . . . .

 

At this point, it almost feels like I’ve been following the securities fraud case against Halliburton my entire career.   I was grimly amused when I heard that the Fifth Circuit had granted an interlocutory appeal – again! – to hear a challenge to class certification – again! and I diligently tracked the docket on Bloomberg, only for it to belatedly sink in that – wait a minute, I actually live in New Orleans now.  I can go see the oral argument in person, live, in color.

So I did.

It was … interesting. 

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Continue Reading Halliburton Again – Groundhog Day

In his article, Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing?” 4 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 235, 237–39 (2014), Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine wrote:

[E]ven if one accepts that those who manage public corporations may, outside of the corporate sales process, treat the best interests of other corporate constituencies as an end equal to the best interests of stockholders, and believes that stockholders should not be afforded additional influence over those managers, those premises do very little to actually change the managers’ incentives in a way that would encourage them to consider the interests of anyone other than stockholders. . . . even if corporate law supposedly grants directors the authority to give other constituencies equal consideration to stockholders outside of the sale context, it employs an unusual accountability structure to enable directors to act as neutral balancers of the diverse, and not always complementary, interests affected by corporate conduct. In that accountability structure, owners of equity securities are the only constituency given any rights. Stockholders get to elect directors. Stockholders get to vote on mergers and substantial asset sales. Stockholders get to inspect the books and records. Stockholders get the right to sue. No other constituency is given any of these rights. (emphasis added, citations omitted)

There has been a lot of anger and shock in the reporting over the price increases by EpiPen-maker Mylan. See, e.g., here, here, here, and here, but I think Chief Justice Strine’s observation about the general accountability structure of corporate law is at least a partial explanation. (To be sure, there also appears to be an executive compensation story, though the executive compensation structure may be driven by the shareholder-centric accountability structure. That said, Mylan appears to be a Netherlands-incorporate company, and I know very little about the structure of its corporate law.)

The price for an EpiPen has increased a staggering amount since 2007 when pharmaceutical company Mylan acquired the product – wholesaling for $100 in 2007; $103.50 in 2009; $264.50 in 2013; $461 in 2015; $608.61 in 2016.

The general tone of the reporting in the mainstream media is one of outrage.

But isn’t this to be expected? Granted, the business judgment rule provides a lot of leeway, and I would not argue that Mylan was “forced” to hike prices, even if Mylan were incorporated in Delaware. But if we give shareholders virtually all of the significant corporate governance tools, isn’t it obvious that directors and officers will often seek shareholder interests even when it is harmful to communities? The bigger story here may be that certain norms and the fear of negative press have been able to keep plenty of other companies from following suit.

My article Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, due out next semester in the American Business Law Journal, suggests giving some of the corporate governance accountability tools (such as certain voting rights) to a stakeholder advisory board made up of stakeholder representatives. The article argues that adoption of stakeholder advisory boards should be mandatory for large social enterprises (because they both chose a social entity form and have the resources) and should be voluntarily adopted by other serious socially-conscious companies. An accountability change of this sort might bring public expectations and the corporate law accountability structure into line.

Separately, are there certain industries – like the health care industry – that we want to be less profit-focused than others? For those industries, perhaps requiring (or making attractive through regulations/taxes) the choice of a social enterprise form (like benefit corporation) may make some sense. However, as noted in my article, the benefit corporation accountability structure is quite shareholder-centric, similar to the structure for traditional corporations. Granted, socially-motivated shareholders may exert some pressure on benefit corporations and the benefit corporation law may give them a somewhat better chance to do so, but if we want real change, I think the corporate accountability structure needs to be more completely redesigned.

Personal Note: When I was a child, my mom carried an EpiPen for me, following an incident involving plastic armor, a tennis racket, and whacking a big bee nest. 

I previously wrote on the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance released by high profile investors and corporate titans such as Jamie Dimon and Warren Buffet. Others, such as Steve Bainbridge have also weighed in. Now proxy advisory firm Glass Lewis has spoken, stating in part:

While the Principles may disappoint investors expecting a more comprehensive and robust approach similar to that found in the UK and other countries, there are a few areas where the principles promote forward-thinking stances. For example, the Principles criticize dual class voting structures and state that companies should consider specific sunset provisions based upon time or a triggering event to eventually eliminate dual class structures. This is notwithstanding the dual class structure at signatory Warren Buffet’s company Berkshire Hathaway…

There are several areas the Principles do not address, including key anti-takeover defenses such as poison pills, supermajority vote requirements and classified boards. The Principles generally address some issues such as special meeting rights and term/age limits for directors but do not recommend specific thresholds or tenure limits…

Despite the Principles’ relatively narrow scope and high level, we believe they contain enough substance to spark a dialogue inside boardrooms, which could lead to increased shareholder engagement from boards that traditionally have relied on executives and investor relations departments to lead those efforts. In our view, direct engagement between investors and boards leads to greater transparency and fosters mutual understanding of the company and its strategy, promoting long-term value creation. As a result, the Principles could have a salutary effect on companies, shareholders and the market.

Given the concern expressed by some in the business community and Congress about the “undue influence” of proxy advisory firms, the Glass Lewis statement is worth a read.

House Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Democrat of New York, sent a formal request to a slew of federal agencies to share trading data collected in connection with the Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule prohibits U.S. banks from engaging in proprietary trading (effective July 21, 2015), while permitting legitimate market-making and hedging activities.  The Volcker Rule restricts commercial banks (and affiliates) from investing investing in certain hedge funds and private equity, and imposes enhanced prudential requirements on systemically identified non-bank institutions engaged in such activities.

Representative Maloney requested  the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission to analyze seven quantitative trading metrics that regulators have been collecting since 2014 including: (1) risk and position limits and usage; (2) risk factor sensitivities; (3) value-at-risk (VaR) and stress VaR; (4) comprehensive profit and loss attribution; (5) inventory turnover; (6) inventory aging; and (7) customer facing trade ratios.

Representative Maloney requested the agencies analyze the data and respond to the following questions:

  • The extent to which the data showed significant changes in banks’ trading activities leading up to the July 21, 2015 effective date for the prohibition on proprietary trading. To the extent that the data did not show a significant change in the banks’ trading activities leading up to the July 21, 2015 effective date, whether the agencies believe this is attributable to the banks having ceased their proprietary trading activities prior to the start of the metrics reporting in July 2014.

  • Whether there are any meaningful differences in either overall risk levels or risk tolerances — as indicated by risk and position limits and usage, VaR and stress VaR, and risk factor sensitivities — for trading activities at different banks.

  • Whether the risk levels or risk tolerances of similar trading desks are comparable across banks reporting quantitative metrics. Similarly, whether the data show any particular types of trading desks (e.g., high-yield corporate bonds, asset-backed securities) that have exhibited unusually high levels of risk.

  • How examiners at the agencies have used the quantitative metrics to date.

  • How often the agencies review the quantitative metrics to determine compliance with the Volcker Rule, and what form the agencies’ reviews of the quantitative metrics take.

  • Whether the quantitative metrics have triggered further reviews by any of the agencies of a bank’s trading activities, and if so, the outcome of those reviews

  • Any changes to the quantitative metrics that the agencies have made, or are considering making, as a result of the agencies’ review of the data received as of September 30, 2015.

The agencies’ response to the request may provide insight into Dodd-Frank/Volcker Rule, the role of big data in the rule-making process (and re-evaluation), and bigger issues such as whether systemic financial risk is definable by regulation and quantifiable in data collection.  I will post regulatory responses, requested by October 30th, here on the BLPB.

-Anne Tucker

So, I am very anti-fraud, and I think cheaters should not prosper.  But I also think courts should know what they are talking about, especially in criminal cases. The following is from a new Second Circuit case: 
Although we review claims of insufficiency de novo, United States v. Harvey, 746 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2014), it is well recognized that “a defendant mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden” because “in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.”  . . . 
[W]e reject Jasmin’s challenge to her Hobbs Act conviction. The evidence presented at trial more than sufficiently describes the consideration received by Jasmin in exchange for her official actions as Mayor, including the $5,000 in cash from Stern, “advance” cash for their partnership, and shares in the limited liability corporation that would develop the community center.
United States v. Jasmin, No. 15-2546-CR, 2016 WL 4501977, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2016). 
 
I can’t actually figure out exactly what’s going on here, but I know a few things: (1) “advance” cash for a partnership probably needs to be assessed more closely because, what partnership? and (2) there should not be shares in a “limited liability corporation.” Or maybe there should be, if they just mean “corporation.” But I think they mean an LLC, which should provide membership interests.  At a minimum, I would love to see a court call people out in such situations for perpetrating frauds with incorrect entity forms. Yeah, I’m that kind of law nerd. 
Imagine this: Professor walks into Business Associations class Monday morning at 8:00 am having prepared to cover 14 pages of reading when she assigned only three (intending, when creating the syllabus, as she later recalled, to use the time to summarize, contrast, and compare agency law rules that will again come into play in partnership and other entity law–and to catch up, if need be).  OK.  The professor is me.  First lesson (which I thought I had learned many moons ago): always double-check the syllabus on what you’ve assigned.
 
So, what happened in class?  Well, the students didn’t let on that the outline for the class plan that I scripted out on the whiteboard seemed to go beyond the reading.  But they might not have recognized that, since it was only an outline.  However, once I started covering the unassigned material, someone did alert me to my error.  Shocked (!), I told them that I had been too nice (weak response) and that–obviously–I had not checked the syllabus to confirm the day’s reading assignment before scripting out the class plan and preparing for class.
 
I didn’t then let the students go after learning of the mistake (having covered in summary fashion those three pages in about 15 minutes of class time). Instead, I constructed a hypothetical set of facts relating to a business conducted as a sole proprietorship from the facts of the partnership case on the syllabus for Wednesday (which I had prepared to cover for today) and asked the students to analyze contract and tort liability based on the hypothetical using the agency law rules we covered over the past four classes.  Detriment: people weren’t prepared for this based on the prompts in the syllabus for today’s class, and it took a while (and a board diagram) to establish the facts of the hypothetical with some (albeit far-from-perfect) clarity.  Benefit: many students learned that they don’t yet know/understand agency law, and I got the opportunity to give the students a few pointers on how partnership law will be different from agency law.
 
Did I make the right choice?  I am following up with a post on the course TWEN site to capture the agency law rules we covered in class (to which the students did not have many salient citations).  What else can I do to take this lemon and turn it into lemonade?  All suggestions are welcomed.

I’ve been fascinated by the efforts of various state attorneys general to investigate Exxon for securities fraud on the ground that its climate change denial misleads investors about the risks of investing in the company.  Exxon has filed a lawsuit in Texas to halt the inquiries, arguing that they infringe on its free speech rights, and Congressman Lamar Smith, head of the House science committee, has subpoenaed the attorneys general involved, to determine if this is a coordinated political attack on the company.  The dispute has even made it into the Democratic party platform, which states that “All corporations owe it to their shareholders to fully analyze and disclose the risks they face, including climate risk. …  Democrats also respectfully request the Department of Justice to investigate allegations of corporate fraud on the part of fossil fuel companies accused of misleading shareholders and the public on the scientific reality of climate change.”

An investigation by the Virgin Islands was dropped; as far as I know, both the New York and Massachusetts investigations continue, and investigations by other states.  Exxon’s lawsuit remains pending.

It’s not a new idea, to claim that securities regulation impinges on free speech rights – the DC Circuit struck down part of the SEC’s conflict minerals rule on just that ground – but usually these arguments are aimed at rules that require issuers to speak, or prohibit issuers from making truthful statements.  The Exxon case is unusual because it comes in the context of, well, false statements.

At the same time, though, one cannot help but suspect that the real concern isn’t investors, but the nature of Exxon’s participation in public political debates.

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Continue Reading Free Speech, Securities Regulation, and Exxon (plus a video about Business Associations)