The SEC has released an interesting statistical report on hedge funds and other private investment funds. The data is compiled from Form ADVs and Form PFs filed by the funds’ advisers. Definitely worth looking at if you’re interested in private funds. It’s available here.

Recently, a number of the sports media outlets, including ESPN, the Pac-12 Network, and Fox Sports featured a company called Oculus that makes virtual reality headsets used by Stanford University quarterback Kevin Hogan, among other players, to prepare for games.

In 2012, Oculus raised about $2.4 million from roughly 9,500 people via crowdfunding website Kickstarter. Following this extremely successful crowdfunding campaign, Oculus attracted over $90 million in venture capital investment. In mid-2014, Facebook acquired Oculus for a cool $2 billion. 

Oculus is only one example, but it caused me to wonder how many companies are using crowdfunding to attract venture capital, and, if so, whether that strategy is working. This study claims that 9.5% of hardware companies with Kickstarter or Indigogo campaigns that raised over $100,000 went on to attract venture capital. Without a control group, however, it is a bit difficult to tell whether this is a significantly higher percentage than would have been able to attract venture capital money without the big crowdfunding raises. 

If I were a venture capitalist (and I was raised by one, so I have some insight), I would see a big crowdfunding raise as potentially useful evidence regarding public support for the company and/or product demand. Crowdfunding, in some cases, might also be a helpful check on venture capitalist groupthink and biases. 

As a venture capitalist, however, the type of crowdfunding used would matter to me. In most cases, I imagine I would see a large gift-based or rewards-based crowdfunding raise as a significant positive. Gift-based crowdfunding is essentially free money for the company, and reward-based crowdfunding usually comes with minimal costs or is simply pre-ordered product. Gift-based or rewards-based crowdfunders could create some negative press for the company when the company raises outside money, as the crowdfunders did in the Oculus case (see here and here), but that seems like a relatively small problem in most cases.

In contrast, the costs and risks associated with equity crowdfunding, in the states it is currently allowed, would raise at least a yellow flag for me. Equity crowdfunding comes with so many strings attached to various small shareholders that I could see it scaring off venture capitalists. The administrative headache, plus the risk of multiple lawsuits from uninformed investors seems significant. In addition, owners who have engaged in equity crowdfunding have a smaller percentage of equity in their hands and may have raised the crowdfunded money at an unattractive valuation.

At least two of my co-bloggers have written significant articles on crowdfunding (see, e.g., here and here), so perhaps they will weigh in on whether they have seen companies using crowdfunding as a strategy to attract venture capital, whether it is working, and whether the type of crowdfunding really matters.

How and when should CSR codes be enforced through litigation? This short article by Jan M. Smits attempts to answer that question. The abstract is below and the link to the article is here:

A central question in the debate on corporate social responsibility is to what extent CSR Codes can be enforced among private parties. This contribution argues that this question is best answered by reference to the applicable doctrinal legal system. Such a doctrinal approach has recently regained importance in American scholarship, while it is still the prevailing method of legal analysis in Europe. Applying a doctrinal analysis of CSR Codes allows to make the possibility of private law enforcement, i.e. enforcement by means of contract or tort, dependent on three different elements: the exact type of claim that is brought, the evolving societal standards about the binding nature of CSR Codes, and the normative complexity of the doctrinal system itself. This approach allows to make a typology of cases in which the enforceability of CSR Codes can be disputed. It is subsequently argued that societal standards have not yet reached the stage where the average consumer who buys a product from a retailer can keep that retailer legally liable for violations of the norms incorporated in the code.

Fellow BLPB editor Haskell Murray highlighted Laureate Education’s IPO (here on BLPB) last week as the first publicly traded benefit corporation.  Steven Davidoff Solomon, the “Deal Professor” on Dealbook at NYT, focused on the interesting issues that can be raised by public benefit corporations in his article, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for Pragmatism, which appeared yesterday.  Among the concerns he raised were the  vagueness of the “benefit”provided by the company, the potential laxity or at least untested waters of benefit auditing, and the potential for management rent seeking at the expense of shareholder profit in the new form.  Davidoff Solomon, who (deliciously and derisively) dubs benefit corporations the “hipster alternative to today’s modern company, which is seen as voracious in its appetite for profits,” is certainly skeptical. But the concerns are valid and will have to be worked out successfully for this hybrid form to carve out a place in the securities market.  What I found particularly interesting was his focus on the role of institutional investors, who as fiduciaries for their individual investors, have fiduciary obligations to pursue profits which may be in conflict with or at least require greater monitoring when investing in these alternative firms.  The question of institutional investors’ appetite for alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations, is the focus of a recent article of mine, Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, and a big question for the future success of these firms.

For those of you wanting to highlight alternative firms in a general corporations course or a seminar, this article would be a good introduction and an accessible summary of the issues on the forefront. I will be including this in my seminar reading next semester as it is surely to generate discussion.

-Anne Tucker

 

Last week was the oral midterm examination week for students in my in Business Associations class.  I admit to exhaustion and jubilation at the end of that week every year.  I think the students feel about the same way . . . .

This year’s examination related to an expulsion of members in a member-managed limited liability company (LLC).  The facts were based on an interesting Tennessee case with which many LLC aficionados are no doubt familiar: Anderson v. Wilder.  The exam questions related to the validity and effects of the expulsion under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the LLC’s operating agreement, the potential breaches of fiduciary duty and failure to comply with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and the possible resulting causes of action and remedies–including any effects of the members’ dissociation.

In a blog post last weekend from Lou Sirico and our other friends at the Legal Skills Prof Blog, I divined support for all of us who engage in practice-focused legal education: these teaching/learning methods can help students to thrive, not merely survive.  It has been my (admittedly anecdotal) observation that students who engage in simulations (as well as those who participate in clinics and internships/externships) in law school are happier and more well-adjusted about their education and their post-graduation employment.  Last week’s oral midterms–conducted in groups of three–gave me some windows on that world.  I will share a few here.

Continue Reading Encouraging Student “Thriving” Through Group Simulations

TMR

I am happy to report that Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, currently a partner in Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati’s Wilmington, DE office, has been nominated to become a Vice Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery.

Tamika and I first met as summer associates at Miller & Martin after our 1L years. We both clerked on the Delaware Court of Chancery, albeit for different judges and during different years. We then worked together in the same practice group, as fellow associates, at Weil Gotshal in NYC.

All of that to say, I have worked with Tamika, or I guess I will soon be saying “Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves,” on a number of occasions and think she will do an excellent job. Tamika has both the intelligence and personality to be a global ambassador for the court, as a number of Delaware judges before her have been. She will be a great addition to the Delaware Court of Chancery. I look forward to reading her opinions and following her career.

Readers of this blog know how much I hate courts that call LLCs “corporations.” (If you’re a new reader, welcome. And now you know, too.)  I am also one who likes to remind people that entity choices come with both rights and obligations, as do choices about whether to have an entity at all. Recent events in Illinois touch on both of these issues. 

A recent news story from Chicago’s NBC affiliate laments a recent court decision in Illinois that requires entities to have counsel if they are to make an appeal, even in the administrative process related to a parking ticket.  The story can be found here.  The short story is this: if one registers a vehicle in the name of a corporation, then the corporation must be represented by counsel to contest the ticket.  The reason for this determination comes from a non-parking related decision from 2014. 

In that decision, Stone Street Partners LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, the court determined that “the City’s administrative hearings, like judicial proceedings, involve the admission of evidence and examination and cross-examination of sworn witnesses–all of which clearly constitute the practice of law.” 12 N.E.3d 691, at ¶ 15 (Ill. App. Ct. May 20, 2014). As such, the court held, the “representation of corporations at administrative hearings–particularly those which involve testimony from sworn witnesses, interpretation of laws and ordinances, and can result in the imposition of punitive fines–must be made by a licensed attorney at law.” Id. at ¶ 16.

As the news story reports, the parking division has adopted this rationale. Thus, the owner of an entity, even a sole owner, cannot represent the entity in an administrative challenge (unless he or she is a licensed attorney).  The report notes that the parking tickets were “unfair,” which seems to be a fair characterization because the recipient appears to show that she had paid for the spot but was given a ticket anyway. Okay, so it stinks that the city gave an erroneous ticket, but the idea that the entity has different rules than an individual doesn’t exercise me much at all.   

The complaint is that a small corporation is somehow unduly burdened by this rule.  They even talked to Chicago Kent law professor Harold Krent, who agrees.  The report notes:

“The problem is when the rule is applied to a very small corporation — particularly if the corporation is one person — the rule doesn’t make any sense,” Krent explained. “I think that if it’s asked, the court itself would carve out an exception for the simple category of traffic tickets. It doesn’t make sense if the corporation is an individual. The individual should be able to represent him or herself just like they can in any other case.”

I respectfully disagree.  First, it makes a lot of sense if you take seriously the reciprocal nature of limited liability. That is, if the owner of a small corporation went bankrupt and the entity did not have funds to pay the parking tickets, I would adamantly defend the small business owner’s individual right to avoid the ticket.  The city should not be able to just disregard the entity in that instance just because the corporation is an individual.  But for that to work, I think it has to work both ways.  

Second, the small business owner in this instance almost certainly made this specific decision to gain the protections of the entity.  I don’t know Illinois car registration well, but it is my understanding that, if you lease a vehicle, the vehicle is owned by an entity, but registered (in part) in the lessee’s name. In such a case, the lessee is responsible for parking tickets, and could thus contest them in their individual capacity.  As such, it’s likely that an individual could choose to register the car in their own name; they just chose not to.  Decisions have consequences. 

Now, I may agree with Prof. Krent in some ways, in that I will concede that it does seem a little silly to suggest that the procedural nature of contesting a parking ticket through the mail is something that requires a law license, and I am pretty sure it’s not efficient, but it’s not an unreasonable decision from the court, either. And it’s a decision that can likely be fixed by the legislature (despite some strong language in Stone Street). Still, as the court notes, “If anything, our holding will protect the rights of corporations which may lose valuable rights or property because they have lost administrative hearings due to the presence of an unqualified representative working on their behalf.”  Id. at ¶ 19.

Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not point out a major flaw in the the Stone Street decision.  The entity — Stone Street Partners, LLC —  is a limited liability company.  It is not a corporation. However, making the same type of mistake so many other courts have, throughout the decision the court called Stone Street “the corporation” and its counsel is called “corporation counsel.”  So, what we have here is a case that requires those who form an entity to respect the entity, but the court fails to respect the entity type.  It appears it’s just too much to ask to have both. 

H/T: Kentucky Business Entity Law

Last week,  I asked whether casebooks should include statutes. That post provoked a healthy debate in the comments and elsewhere. Today, I want to address another content question, this one dealing not with the content of casebooks but with the content of the Business Associations course itself. What securities law topics should be included in the basic business associations course?

The answer to that question obviously depends on whether the course is for three or four credit hours. I don’t think a comprehensive business associations course should ever be limited to three credit hours. But, if I had to teach a three-hour course, I would not cover any securities law. Agency, partnership, corporations, and LLCs are already too much to cram into a three-hour course. Adding securities topics on top of all that would, in my opinion, make the course too superficial.

Luckily, I have the hard-fought right to teach B.A. as a four-hour course. In a four-hour course, I think it’s essential to cover proxy regulation. Federal law or not, it’s mainstream corporate governance, at least for public companies, and many, perhaps most, securities regulation courses don’t cover it.

Beyond that, I’m not sure any securities coverage is absolutely essential. I spend a few minutes on the registration of securities offerings and a few minutes on Rule 10b-5 and securities fraud. I cover both topics in my Securities Regulation course, so I don’t want to cover either topic in any detail, but it’s so easy to stumble into these areas without even realizing it that every future lawyer should be warned. My main message: if you’re not a regular practitioner of securities law, call a securities lawyer. It’s too complicated to pick up on your own.

When I say I cover those topics in a few minutes, I mean no cases and, except for the text of 10b-5, no regulations. Just a brief summary by me of the potential pitfalls.

I do cover insider trading in depth. It could be relegated to the basic securities course; I cover the rest of Rule 10b-5 in Securities Regulation. But it just seems to work better in Business Associations, perhaps because of its focus on fiduciary duties. And covering it in B.A. keeps me from having to cram even more into my three-hour Securities Regulation course.

I would be interested in hearing what others think about this. Which securities law topics should be covered in the basic B.A. course and which should be relegated to Securities Regulation?  

Between the US Supreme Court’s decision to let Newman stand and the Delaware Supreme Court’s Sanchez decision, the intersection of friendship and corporate governance has been a hot topic this past week.  While the commentary has been enlightening, it’s always good to reflect on the primary sources.  To that end, I have collected below a series of what I perceive to be interesting quotes from the relevant opinions as follows (I also included an excerpt from a law review article referencing Reg FD, which has something to say about the extent to which we need to protect insider communications with analysts):

1.  Dirks v. S.E.C., 

2.  United States v. Newman, 

3.  United States v. Salman, 

4.  Delaware Cnty. Employees Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 

5.  Dirks v. S.E.C. (dissent, excerpt 1),

6.  Dirks v. S.E.C. (dissent, excerpt 2), and 

7.  Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials and the Case for an Fgd (Fairer Government Disclosure) Regime.

Obviously, Sanchez may be viewed as an outlier here, but perhaps this will spur some creative work on how the standard for director independence might inform the standard for improper tipping or vice versa.

Continue Reading Friendship & #corpgov

There’s been something of a debate recently about whether there’s a bubble in tech startups.  It is believed that 140 have reached “unicorn” status, i.e., valuations of $1 billion or more, and numerous voices have been raised questioning the legitimacy of those valuations.  Venture capitalists insist the valuations are legitimate, but I think Buzzfeed’s story about recently-foaled unicorn JustFab is a rather powerful demonstration that something has gone awry.

JustFab offers discount clothing and shoes on a subscription basis; shoppers pay a monthly fee to have access to the products.  The problem is, according to Buzzfeed, JustFab has received thousands of complaints from consumers who claim that they were unaware they would be charged monthly subscription fees, and found themselves unable to cancel the service.   JustFab recently settled a lawsuit brought by district attorneys in Santa Clara and Santa Cruz alleging that it deceived customers.  Even more troubling are the allegations that JustFab’s founders have a long history of forming similar companies, on a similar subscription model, that also generated considerable consumer ire – as well as complaints by credit card companies because of all the chargebacks, and an FTC complaint that settled for $50 million.  At least according to BuzzFeed, JustFab’s original financing came from investments by these other, now defunct, entities – prompting lawsuits by those entities’ creditors.

JustFab may turn out to be a legitimate company, or it may simply be an outlier.  Nonetheless, its unicorn status raises doubts about the herd.