May 2018

If I have learned anything over the years, it is that I should not expect any court to be immune from messing up entities. Delaware, as a leader in business law and the chosen origin for so many entities, though, seems like a place that should be better than most with regard to understanding, distinguishing, and describing entities.  Sometimes they get things rights, as I argued here, and other times they don’t.  A recent case is another place where they got something significant incorrect. 

The case starts off okay:

Plaintiffs brought this action under federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), asserting that complete diversity of citizenship exists among the parties. In Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, however, they argue that complete diversity of the parties is lacking. Federal jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of citizenship, meaning that “no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.” Midlantic Nat. Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). 

Cliffs Nat. Res. Inc. v. Seneca Coal Res., LLC, No. CV 17-567, 2018 WL 2012900, at *1

I was fascinated by Ann Lipton’s post on April 14.  I started to type a comment, but it got too long.  That’s when I realized it was actually a responsive blog post.  

Ann’s post, which posits (among other things) that corporate chief executives might be required to comply with their fiduciary duties when they are acting in their capacity as private citizens, really made me think.  I understand her concern.  I do think it is different from the disclosure duty issues that I and others scope out in prior work.  (Thanks for the shout-out on that, Ann.)  Yet, I struggled to find a concise and effective response to Ann’s post. Here is what I have come up with so far.  It may be inadequate, but it’s a start, at least.

Fiduciary duties are contextual.  One can have fiduciary duties to more than one independent legal person at the same time, of course, proving this point. (Think of those overlapping directors, Arledge and Chitiea in Weinberger.  They’re a classic example!)  What enables folks to know how to act in these situations is a proper identification of the circumstances in which the person is acting.

So, for example, an agent’s

Zohar Goshen and Sharon Hannes have just posted to SSRN an interesting paper, The Death of Corporate Law, arguing that markets and private ordering have begun to supplant adjudication as a mechanism for resolving corporate disputes because the increasing sophistication of investors has made private resolutions less costly. 

There are many excellent insights in the piece, which furthers the taxonomy developed by Goshen and Richard Squire in Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance to add the costs of adjudication into the mix.  Yet there may be some ways that the theory is incomplete.  For example, the authors focus on the effect of shareholders’ rising “competence” – because of the concentration of investment in the hands of institutions – rather than on shareholders’ rising power, which (according to some) may not be accompanied by greater competence at all.  Managers have acted to counteract that rising power (dual class stock regimes, delays in going public), which might represent an efficient bargain to which investors are agreeing (the authors’ view), or simply a forthcoming source of dispute.

But the other piece that’s missing, of course, is the role of securities law.  Investors’ rising power

In 2015, I and several academics and other experts traveled to Guatemala as part of the Lat-Crit study space. The main goal of the program was to examine the effect of the extractive industries on indigenous peoples and the environment. During our visit, we met with indigenous peoples, government ministers, the chamber of commerce, labor leaders, activists (some who had received multiple death threats), and village elders.

Our labor of love, From Extraction to Emancipation Development Reimagined, edited by Raquel Aldana and Steve Bender, was released this week. My chapter “Corporate Social Responsibility in Latin America: Fact or Fiction” introduces the book. I first blogged about CSR in the region in 2015 in the context of a number of companies that had touted their records but in fact, had been implicated in environmental degradation and even murder. Over the past few years, one of the companies I blogged about, Tahoe Resources, has been sued in Canada for human rights violations, the Norwegian pension fund has divested, and shareholders have filed a class action based on allegations re: the rights of indigenous people.

Although the whole book should be of interest to business law professors and practitioners, chapters of particular interest

Here’s how this week’s post came to be.  I thought: “I should probably write about something other than LLCs being mischaracterized by courts. Maybe I will add some thoughts about Joan’s post about her thoughtful new essay, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise. But first, I’ll read through the cases that call LLCs ‘limited liability corporations.'”  And read them I did.  I was about to let it go, but then I read something that (as usual) made me cringe. It’s from a 2012 opinion that apparently just showed up on Westlaw. Here it is:
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS.
 
. . . . The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, are as follows. Plaintiff Edgar Lopez is a New Mexico resident. Compl. at 1, ¶ 1. Lopez owns and operates Plaintiff IMA, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability corporation that formerly managed the Perry Corners Shopping Center. . . . Lopez is the managing partner and the only surviving voting member of Hunt Partners, LLC, a Nevada corporation that has its principal place of business in New Mexico. . . . . Hunt Partners wholly owns, as the “sole

The AALS Section on Taxation is pleased to announce the following Call for Papers. Selected papers will be presented at a works-in-progress session at the 2019 AALS Annual Meeting in New Orleans, LA from January 2-6, 2019. The works-in-progress session is tentatively scheduled for Saturday, January 5.
 
Eligibility: Scholars teaching at AALS member schools or non-member fee-paid schools with seven or fewer years of full-time teaching experience as of the submission deadline are eligible to submit papers. For co-authored papers, both authors must satisfy the eligibility criteria.
 
Due Date: 5 pm, Wednesday, August 8, 2018.
 
Form and Content of submission: We welcome drafts of academic articles in the areas of taxation, tax policy, public finance, and related fields. We will consider drafts that have not yet been submitted for publication consideration as well as drafts that have been submitted for publication consideration or that have secured publication offers. However, drafts may not have been published at the time of the 2019 AALS Annual Meeting (January 2019). We welcome legal scholarship across a wide variety of methodological approaches, including empirical, doctrinal, socio-legal, critical, comparative, economic, and other approaches.
 
Submission method: Papers should be submitted electronically as Microsoft Word documents to the