The BLPB editors have been nice enough to let me pen a quick post concerning an idea I floated way back in May. In my role as that month’s guest blogger, I offered my thoughts on how rationalizing—that very powerful, and very human, psychological process that allows us to view ourselves positively (say, as an upstanding citizen, family man, etc.), while taking actions inconsistent with that view according to society’s standards (say, by passing a stock tip to a friend, misrepresenting a company’s financials, etc.)—helps explain corporate wrongdoing. I also offered a thesis for how overcriminalization, particularly in the white collar area, might be fostering rationalizations, and thus undermining crime control efforts. In a bit of a cliffhanger (not quite Game of Thrones quality, but a cliffhanger nonetheless), I promised a final post discussing how these ideas impact corporate compliance. Well, almost a year later, I’ve finally finished an article on the topic. Let me know what you think (and also if John Snow is really dead.)

Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016).

Corporate compliance is becoming increasingly “criminalized.” What began as a means of industry self-regulation has morphed into a multi-billion dollar effort to avoid government intervention in business, specifically criminal and quasi-criminal investigations and prosecutions. In order to avoid application of the criminal law, companies have adopted compliance programs that are motivated by and mimic that law, using the precepts of criminal legislation, enforcement, and adjudication to advance their compliance goals. This approach to compliance is inherently flawed, however—it can never be fully effective in abating corporate wrongdoing. Explaining why that is forms this Article’s main contribution. Criminalized compliance regimes are inherently ineffective because they impose unintended behavioral consequences on corporate employees. Employees subject to criminalized compliance have greater opportunities to rationalize their future unethical or illegal behavior. Rationalizations are a key component in the psychological process necessary for the commission of corporate crime—they allow offenders to square their self-perception as “good people” with the illegal behavior they are contemplating, thereby allowing the behavior to go forward. Criminalized compliance regimes fuel these rationalizations, and in turn bad corporate conduct. By importing into the corporation many of the criminal law’s delegitimatizing features, criminalized compliance creates space for rationalizations, facilitating the necessary precursors to the commission of white collar and corporate crime. The result is that many compliance programs, by mimicking the criminal law in hopes of reducing employee misconduct, are actually fostering it. This insight, which offers a new way of conceptualizing corporate compliance, explains the ineffectiveness of many compliance programs and also suggests how companies might go about fixing them.

I usually look forward to the Olympics for months, if not years, before they start.

This year, however, all of the doping news, and buzz around Rule 40 has left me less enthusiastic.

For now, I am going to leave the doping news to one side, and focus on Rule 40.

From July 27 to August 24, 2016, Rule 40, prohibits Non-Olympic Commercial Partners from using the word “Olympics” and (depending on context) “Olympic-related terms,” including:

  • 2016
  • Rio/Rio de Janeiro
  • Gold
  • Silver
  • Bronze
  • Medal
  • Effort
  • Performance
  • Challenge
  • Summer
  • Games
  • Sponsors
  • Victory
  • Olympian

Now, I understand why the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) and the U.S. Olympic Committee (“USOC”) might want these restrictions (given the large sums of money official sponsors pay), and from what I understand from experts in this specific area, the IOC & USOC may have a defensible legal stance.

This, however, seems one of the many areas where (1) the law has not kept up with advances in technology, namely social media, and (2) even if the IOC & USOC are right on the law, they may lose in the court of public opinion. Here, it seems, there is a good bit of difference between a company running a detailed TV-ad noting that it sponsors an Olympian and simply wishing an athlete “Good luck in Rio” on Twitter. Also, even if the law treats social media the same as other forms of advertising, I could see the public (including me) judging the IOC & USOC harshly if it punishes brands and/or their athletes for minor violations. Outside of the most popular Olympic athletes, significant sponsorships are difficult to secure and outlawing short displays of appreciation on social media seems like overreaching. Adding to the problem, I think, is that this rule makes the IOC & USOC look like single bottom line, money-hungry organizations, when most of us would like to associate the Olympics with a broader, higher purpose.      

Legal commentators and the media have been abuzz with news of President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court.  If there was ever reason to be abuzz, in the world of legal news, this is it.  Try to find a summary of Judge Garland’s record in dealing with business law issues, however, and you are met with a silent, dark internet.  Aside from mentions of Judge Garland having taught anti-trust at Harvard there is little discussion of his business jurisprudence.  The D.C. Circuit court hears an administratively heavy caseload, but Judge Garland has been on the bench for nearly 20 years! I set out to uncover his business law barometer.   My initial searches produced  19 opinions that he authored on business law matters, which are mostly securities cases but also include a piercing the corporate veil and contracts claims among others.  While I am no online search wizard and am positive that I have missed some relevant cases, this is what I produced after such wide-net casting as “business law”, “corporations”, “partnership”, “board of directors”, “shareholders” etc.  You get the idea, I ran several undeniably broad searches.  The initial case list is provided below, and was generated (along with annotations) through WestLaw.  Please comment if you have relevant cases to add.  I may add commentary on the cases in a future post if there is interest… (and time).

Securities Law Cases 

  1. Horning v. S.E.C., 570 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

SECURITIES REGULATION – Brokers and Dealers. Mid-trial correction of sanction the SEC sought did not deprive broker-dealer firm’s former director of due process.

  1. Graham v. S.E.C., 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

SECURITIES REGULATION – Fraud. Registered representative aided and abetted customer’s fraud.

  1. Katz v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

SECURITIES REGULATION – Brokers and Dealers. Former registered representation made unsuitable investment recommendations for her customers.

Continue Reading Judge Merrick Garland Opinions on “Business” Law

Jet lag prevented me from posting this yesterday.  (Yes, I am scheduled to be the BLPB every-Monday blogger going forward.)  But at least I am awake enough now to post a bit more on the 7th International Conference on Innovative Trends Emerging in Microfinance (ITEM 7 Conference) I attended last week in Shanghai, China.  My initial post on Wednesday provided some information on Chinese microfinance and the initial day of the conference.  This week, my post focuses on definitional questions that I have been pondering relating to my participation in this series of conferences.  Specifically, I have been sorting through the relationship between microfinance and crowdfunding.  My understanding continues to evolve as I become more familiar with the literature on and practice of microfinance internationally.

At the conference, one of the participants noted that while microfinance and crowdfunding appear to be mutually reinforcing, they still do not enjoy comfortable relations in scholarship and practice.  After weighing that statement for a moment, I had to agree.  I actually have been personally struggling with the nature of the relationship between the two for a few years now.  (I often wonder whether folks like co-blogger Haskell Murray who commonly work in the social enterprise space have this issue in talking about the relationship between social enterprise and corporate social responsibility . . . .)

Two years ago at the ITEM 5 Conference, I posited that crowdfunding could be a vehicle for microfinance.  The establishment of this point required defining both microfinance and crowdfunding–in each case, no small task.  To enable the audience to understand my observation, I used a broad definition of microfinance that focuses on financial inclusion (like the one found here).  I believed after my presentation that I had made the point well enough.

Yet, something still niggled at me after the presentation and conference were long gone.  I kept feeling as if I had inserted a square peg into a round hole.  Something was just a bit off.  Part of the issue is, no doubt, the fact that my observation was incomplete.  Microfinance is bigger than crowdfunding, and not all crowdfunding is microfinance, even under a broad definition.  So, picture a venn diagram like the one below.

VennDiagram

The red point of intersection illustrates crowdfunding’s place as a means of conducting microfinance.  This leaves part of microfinance to be handled through other types of financing (e.g., microcredit).  It also leaves part of crowdfunding to other capital-raising uses.  This conception of the relatonship between microfinance and crowdfunding is undoubtedly more complete.

The importance to microfinance of the non-microfinance part of crowdfunding was confirmed at our microfinance site visit last week in Shanghai.  Our host for the visit explained, in response to my question about the relationship of microfinance to crowdfunding in China, that crowdfunding typically is seen as an alternative to, rather than a means of, microfinance in China.  He noted that equity crowdfunding is uncommon (although growing) in Chinese small business finance overall because the number of shareholders of Chinese limited liability companies is statutorily capped.    Specifically, Article 20 of the Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that “[a] limited liability company shall be jointly invested in and incorporated by not less than two and not more than fifty shareholders.”  I made a mental “note to files” that crowdfunding might get crowded out of microfinance or other types of financing–intentionally or unintentionally–by positive regulation.

I invite any readers who are more familiar with world-wide microfinance than I to comment further on its relationship to crowdfunding.  Do I have the principal story right, in your view, based on your experience?  Can you provide examples from your work or life that help me to see new aspects of the relationship between the two?  I invite any related thoughts.

March has provided a slate of mistakes as to entity form, focusing (as it almost always does) on limited liability companies (LLCs) and various outlets calling such entities “corporations.”  These are not in any particular order, but lists are neat. Enjoy! 

(1 ) Politifact Checks Trump Facts, Forgets to Check Entity Law Facts

In an article on Politifact.com, Donald Trump incorrectly says Virginia winery is the largest on East Coast, which determines that Trump’s claims about the size of a winery that his son runs to be false and notes some statements are incorrect. Ironically, the article also claims: 

A legal disclaimer on the winery website says the GOP presidential candidate doesn’t own the winery. The venture is a limited liability corporation, and its owners are not a matter of public record.

Wrong. The winery site says, “Trump Winery is a registered trade name of Eric Trump Wine Manufacturing LLC, which is not owned, managed or affiliated with Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization or any of their affiliates.”  An LLC is still not a corporation. 

(2) Big Bang Theory: Big Brains Don’t Know Entity Law

I don’t watch the Big Bang Theory, but my colleague at Valparaiso University, Professor Rebecca J. Huss, is a reader of this blog who also cares about precise language with regard to LLCs alerted me to this one.  The story line of the March 10 show (the show can be found here) related to a the creation of a partnership agreement for some of the characters. One thing that is realistic is that the folks think it’s a good idea to form an entity and draft contract language without a lawyer.  One character says he has some concerns about the partnership, and another replies with this “joke”: “Are you suggesting a limited liability corporation, because I did not LLC that coming.” (The offending segment is roughly 14 minutes into the show.) (This was also covered at Kentucky Business Entity Law Blog, here, which noted, “Ughhhh.   LLC ≠ limited liability corporation.  Rather, LLC = limited liability company.”) 

(3) Ghost LLCs Masquerading as Corporations

The Washington Post last week ran a story, How ‘ghost corporations’ are funding the 2016 election. The article discusses how entities can be used to shield those backing political candidates. The article states: 

Advocates for stronger campaign-finance enforcement fear there will be even more pop-up limited liability corporations (LLCs) funneling money into independent groups, making it difficult to discern the identities of wealthy players seeking to influence this year’s presidential and congressional contests.

. . . .

Many corporate givers this cycle are well-established hedge funds, energy companies and real estate firms. But a significant share of the money is coming from newly formed LLCs with cryptic names that offer few clues about their backers.

That LLC definition is wrong, and LLC giving is not “corporate” giving. Perhaps political funding via opaque entities is a problem, but we should try to get our entities right.  There may be problems (and solutions) unique to one entity form or another, so this could be more than semantic.  

 

(4) Pass-Through Tax Law Isn’t Really About Corporations (mostly)

The Topeka Capital-Journal Editorial Board wrote on March 20: LLC loophole needs plugging: Even some small business owners think the tax exemption should be eliminated.  The editorial is related to a 2012 Kansas law, HB 2117, which eliminated taxes on pass-though entities like LLCs, S corps, partnerships, farms, and sole proprietorships. (So, I admit, S corps are corporation, but they are essentially partnerships for federal tax purposes.)  Even though I agree with some their concerns, the board makes a couple mistakes here when they assert that the bill “was simply an unconditional gift from the state for anyone who has created an entity called a limited liability corporation (LLC).”

First, it assumes that just LLCs get the benefit, which is not true. All pass-though entities benefit.  Second, of course, the “limited liability corporation” is a corporation, not an LLC, and the corporation (other than one chosen to be an S corp) does not get the benefit of the law.  

(5) Court Gets Entity Right, Regulations Not Quite

I’m not one to leave the courts out of this.  Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., of the United States District Court, Northern Illinois has an incredible resume.  A member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Rhodes Scholar, his credentials are impressive.  In a recent decision, though, his opinion refers to a defendant LLC correctly, but then goes on to say that Treasury Regulations are silent on treatment of “limited liability corporations.” Alas, that’s not accurate.  Here’s the passage: 

It is undisputed that, as of the date of Anderson Bros.’ withdrawal from the fund, Anderson Bros. (an Illinois corporation) was 100% owned by Anderson. Anderson therefore had a “controlling interest” in Anderson Bros. 29 U.S.C. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(A). At the same time, Defendant (an Illinois limited liability company) was also solely owned by Anderson. Section 1.414(c)-2 of the Treasury Regulations does not address specifically the treatment of limited liability corporations, and the Board does not address this issue in its brief. According to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), “an LLC with only one member is treated as an entity disregarded as separate from its owner for income tax purposes * * *, unless it files Form 8832 and affirmatively elects to be treated as a corporation.” IRS, Single Member Limited Liability Companies, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Single-Member-Limited-Liability-Companies (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).

Bd. of Trustees of the Auto. Mechanics’ Local No. 701 Union & Inustry Pension Fund v. 6516 Ogden Ave., LLC, No. 14-CV-3531, 2016 WL 1043422, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2016) (emphasis added).

 

On Thursday and Friday, I attended Tulane’s 28th Annual Corporate Law Institute. I’d never had the chance to go before, but now that I’m a member of the faculty, it’s a fabulous perk of the job. It was marvelous to get expert, practical analysis of the most pressing issues in corporate governance and M&A practice. I was also delighted to see a couple of my students in attendance – during one of the breaks, they told me how the speakers helped bring together the reality behind the theories they learned in their business courses (and, having never heard Chief Justice Leo Strine speak before, they were predictably … ahem … amazed by his comments).

I’ve compiled a (very) incomplete list of the particular remarks that struck me as interesting or enlightening – with a heavy disclaimer that I wasn’t able to take notes on everything, so this should not be viewed as representative of the conference as a whole. It’s more like, Things From Some Panels Ann Lipton Was Able to Jot Down Quickly. (And also it’s possible I misheard some comments – if so, I apologize!).

I’ll note that the orientation of the speakers was almost all defense-side practice – defending from lawsuits, and defending from activist investors – which made it all the more valuable and interesting when someone spoke up from the other side of the table, or even from a more centrist point of view (the SEC, ISS, M&A journalists, Strine, and Chancellor Andre Bouchard).

[More under the jump]

Continue Reading Tulane’s 28th Annual Corporate Law Institute

Law school can and should be an enriching intellectual experience. For many, however, the three years of law school can also be extremely unhealthy.

What responsibility, if any, do we have as legal academics to encourage healthy behavior by our students? How do we do so?

Many law students have horrendous sleep, exercise, and eating habits. Many of these habits carry over into practice, and probably play at least some role in the numerous, documented health and addiction issues facing law students and lawyers. For undergraduate students, many schools mandate physical education and/or nutrition courses. Should these courses be offered to or mandatory for law students?

Are there things that we are doing as legal educators that encourage unhealthy habits? For example, is testing only once a semester part of the problem or is it simply preparing them for stressful, important events like the bar exam or a big trial?

Just opening this topic for discussion; I don’t think I have good answers yet. Feel free to respond in the comments or send me thoughts via e-mail. I think I lean toward letting law students make their own decisions in this area, especially because some students are older, second-career types. But, given all the problems law students and lawyers face, I wonder if it would be valuable to require something like a one-credit, ungraded course of health and nutrition, which include some exercise time and general health instruction.

ITEM7(MFIVisit-1)

Between jet lag and the comprehensive conference proceedings and activities here in Shanghai, it’s all I can do to stay awake to finish this post . . . . But I am not complaining. Shanghai is a wonderful city, and the 7th International Conference on Innovative Trends Emerging in Microfinance (ITEM 7 Conference) has been a super experience so far.

Given my sleep-deprived state, I will just share with you here today a few key outtakes from the presentations we had yesterday (at a pre-conference site visit to the largest microfinance lender in Shanghai) and earlier today (at the conference itself) on microfinance in China.  Here goes.

  • Chinese microfinance is not really microfinance, in major part. It is SME (small and medium enterprise) lending. MSE loans are loans up to  30,000,000 Yuan RMB (about $4,600,000), and the average single loan amount for MSE lending is about  5,000,000 Yuan RMB (just under $770,000).
  • Unlike those in archetypal microfinance and those involved in actual micro-credit lending transactions in many other countries, borrowers in Chinese microfinance lending (such as it is) are largely men rather than women.
  • Despite these and other marked differences between Chinese microfinance and global microfinance, Chinese microfinance data does not affect global studies of microfinance in a statistically significant way. However, Chinese microfinance data does influence study results for the East Asia and Pacific region to a statistically significant degree.

Most of this was “new news” to me, given that Chinese microfinance is not at the center of my work.  I am sure that I will know even more about it by the end of the conference tomorrow. In the mean time, however, I also enjoyed presentations today about:

  • the willingness of rural Ethiopian farmers to pay for insurance to cover the risks of their business (given by an Italian scholar, for which I was an assigned discussant);
  • a rural microfinance program in Nigeria (given by a research fellow affiliated with the Central Bank of Nigeria);
  • gender-based microfinance lending in Canada (given by a faculty member/Ph.D. student at the University of New Brunswick in Canada);
  • the utility of employing joint use of credit scoring and profit scoring in microfinance (given by a Ph.D. student currently serving as the research associate of the Microfinance Chair at the Burgundy School of Business in Dijon, France);
  • the relationship between financial and social objectives of microfinance (given by a Ph.D. student from the Centre for European Research in Microfinance at the Université de Mons in Belgium); and
  • Participants’ perceptions of two separate microlending programs in Australia, one involving no-interest microloans and the other offering matched savings (given by a Ph.D. student from the University of Queensland in Australia).

I speak tomorrow on crowdfunding intermediation and litigation risk and comment on a paper on crowdfunding and corporate governance. Fingers crossed that I can stay awake long enough to give my presentation . . . . :>)