Hi, my name is Steve, and I’m an academic.

I’m paid to express my opinions. The more I publish, the  greater the rewards: tenure, promotion, raises, summer research grants, chaired professorships, conference invitations.

My situation isn’t unique. The reward structure is the same at most law schools and in the rest of higher education. The more you write, the more you get.

I once asked a dean (who shall remain nameless) what would happen if a faculty member received a summer research grant and the research didn’t pan out, didn’t produce anything worth publishing. The dean said that never happens because you can  find an outlet to publish almost anything.

But do we really need all that “scholarship”? Would the world be any worse if I and other academics spent more time thinking and crafting a few high-quality articles that really added to the discussion, instead of trying to keep up the stream of constant publication? Would law and legal education suffer if we cut the number of law review articles in half?

Incentives are part of the problem. I have been in law teaching for 29 years, and my sense is that the pressure to publish is increasing. Quantity is surpassing quality as the prime criterion. When I entered legal education, two good articles was probably sufficient for tenure. Now, many untenured professors tell me they feel pressured to produce at least one article every year.

Another part of the problem is us. Sometimes, you don’t have anything worthwhile to say. Sometimes, you realize you don’t have anything worthwhile to say. Unfortunately, academics have big egos and, for many of us, the latter set is much smaller than the former, as illustrated by this Venn diagram.

Publication

And maybe part of the problem is generational. (WARNING: OLD FART ABOUT TO RANT ABOUT THE YOUNGSTERS) In a world where everything immediately goes to Facebook or Twitter, constant publication of low-quality material has become the norm. But, in defense of younger academics, the problem may be getting worse, but it’s not new.

 For whatever reason, we’re overindulging in scholarship. Perhaps we need an Academics Anonymous, with a sponsor to call every time we’re about to add more fodder to law reviews. “Hi, my name is Steve, and I’m an academic.”

I noted with favor the other day (to myself, privately) the helpful and interesting commentary on The Glom of our trusted colleague and co-blogger, Usha Rodrigues, regarding the recent press reports on Mylan N.V.’s related-party disclosures.  As the story goes, a firm managed and owned in part by the Vice Chair of Mylan’s board of directors sold some land to an entity owned by one of the Vice Chair’s business associates for $1, and that entity turned around the same day and sold the property to Mylan for its new headquarters for $2.9 million.  Usha’s post focuses on both the mandatory disclosure rules for related-party transactions and the mandatory disclosure rules on codes of ethics.  Two great areas for exploration.

A reporter from the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review called me Thursday to talk about the Mylan matter and some related disclosure issues.  He and I spoke at some length yesterday.  That press contact resulted in this story, published online late last night.  The reporter was, as the story indicates, interested in prior related-party disclosures made by Mylan involving transactions with family members of directors.  This led to a more wide-ranging discussion about the status of family members for various different securities regulation purposes.  It is from this discussion that my quote in the article is drawn.  But our conversation covered many other interesting, related issues.

Continue Reading Mylan and Mandatory Disclosure

This week, the Third Circuit issued is long-awaited decision in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (.pdf), detailing its reasons for its earlier holding that Trinity Wall Street’s shareholder proposal addressing gun sales was excludable from Wal-Mart’s proxy statement.  The decision is interesting in several respects, not the least of which is an apparent split among the panelists regarding the shareholder wealth maximization norm.

[More under the jump]

Continue Reading Guns versus Butter

Like last year, I am going to compile postings of legal studies professor positions in business schools. Perhaps, it is more accurate to say “not in law schools,” as some of these positions may be in political science departments and the like.

For this list, I am only including full-time positions (tenure-track, clinical, visiting, or full-time instructor positions). Most of the positions start in the fall of 2016, but some may start in January of 2016. Feel free to send me any relevant positions to post. I will update the list from time to time.

Updated 1/28/16

Belmont University (assistant, tenure track) (healthcare management/health law)

Bentley University (assistant) (business law and tax)

Blinn College (full-time)

Boise State University (tenure-track) (posted 10/7/15)

Bridgewater State University (tenure-track) (posted 10/30/15) 

Carleton (Canada) (3 assistant professor positions) (deadline 11/27/15) (posted 10/26/15)

College of the Bahamas (assistant) (posted 9/30/15)

Dakota State University (tenure-track) (posted 1/28/16)

Dutchess Community College (tenure track) (posted 1/28/16)

Eastern Illinois University (tenure track) (JD+CPA or LLM in tax) (review begins 9/2/15)

Farmingdale State College (lecturer) (posted 10/7/15)

Fort Hays State University (tenure-track) (posted 1/28/16)

Georgia Gwinnett College (assistant)

IMT Institute (Italy) (professor)

Indiana University (tenure track & non-tenure track positions) (law and/or ethics)

Lamar University (LLM in Tax) (assistant or associate) (posted 9/30/15)

Missouri State University (instructor) (posted 9/18/15)

North Florida (instructor)

Pennsylvania State University (2 positions, assistant, tenure-track, labor & employment; workplace ethics) (posted 9/15/15)

Southern Connecticut State University (assistant professor) (deadline 11/27/15) (posted 10/26/15)

St. Jerome’s University-Waterloo (assistant, tenure-track) (deadline 10/15/15)

St. Xavier University (assistant/associate) (posted 1/28/16)

Tennessee State University (assistant, tenure-track) (posted 12/11/15) (PHD in American Politics)

Texas A&M-Central Texas (visiting assistant professor)

University of California, Berkeley (lecturer) (deadline 12/1/15)

University of California, Santa Cruz (lecturer) (posted 1/28/16) (review starts 3/1/16)

University of Central Florida (tenured, associate/professor) (posted 9/20/15)

University of Delaware (instructor) (posted 1/28/16)

University of Kansas (lecturer, for January 2016)

University of Illinois (Springfield) (assistant professor)

University of St. Thomas (tenure-track) (business law and ethics)

University of Washington-Bothell (assistant, tenure-track) (posted 9/14/15)

University of Wisconsin-Green Bay (lecturer) (deadline 10/12/15) (for Jan. 2016)

Warner University (assistant, associate) (posted 12/11/15)

Western Carolina University (2 tenure-track, 1 fixed term) (posted 12/11/15)

Western Illinois University (assistant or associate, tenure-track) (posted 12/22/15)

Winona State University (assistant, tenure-track) (posted 10/18/15)

I’ve always been eager to do pro bono work. I went to law school with the intent of helping the indigent upon graduation, but then with a six-figure debt load, I went to BigLaw in New York and Miami, and then corporate America so that I could pay that debt off. But even as an associate and as in house counsel, I dutifully accepted pro bono cases. As a relatively new academic, I paid my way out of pro bono for the first couple of years as Florida allows and assuaged my guilt with the knowledge that my payments were going to fund the local legal aid office.

This year, as a condition of attending a family law CLE for free, I volunteered to take a case. I’ve devoted over 70 hours to it thus far, and we still aren’t finished even after today’s marathon 6.5 hour hearing dealing with a motion for contempt and enforcement, modification of alimony and child support, a QDRO (qualified domestic relations order), and a house in foreclosure. The case was complicated even according to my seasoned family law practitioner friends.

As a former litigator and current BA professor, I found that my skills helped to make up for my lack of family law expertise. The techniques for cross examining witnesses, preparing for hearing, and introducing exhibits came flooding back. From a BA perspective, knowing to ask questions about the structure of the petitioner’s LLC, inquiring about charging orders, and dissecting the financial statements and corporate tax returns put me in a much better position to protect my client’s interests. I always tell my students on the first day of BA that they never know where they will end up as practitioners, and that in today’s market many of them will be in small firms taking on a number of kind of clients. I try to make them understand how BA can help them in practice areas that don’t seem directly related to business. Now, thanks to this pro bono case I can back that up with proof from my own experience. 

Last September, I authored a post here on the BLPB on judicial opinions and related statutes regarding LLCs as non-signatories to LLC operating agreements (simply termed “LLC agreements” in Delaware and a number of other states).  I recently posted a draft of an essay to SSRN that includes commentary on that same issue as part of a preliminary exploration of the law on LLC operating agreements as contracts.  (Readers may recall that I mentioned this work in a post last month on the Law and Society Association conference.)  I am seeking comments on this draft, which is under editorial review at the SMU Law Review as part of a symposium issue of essays in honor of our departed business law colleague, Alan R. Bromberg, who had been an SMU Dedman School of Law faculty member for many years before his death in March 2014.  My SSRN abstract for the essay, entitled “The Ties That Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding Commitments,” reads as follows:

This essay, written in honor and memory of Professor Alan R. Bromberg as part of a symposium issue of the Southern Methodist University Law Review, is designed to provide preliminary answers to two questions. First: is a limited liability company (“LLC”) operating agreement (now known under Delaware law and in certain other circles as a limited liability company agreement) a contract? And second: should we care either way? These questions arise out of, among other things, a recent bankruptcy court case, In re Denman, 513 B.R. 720, 725 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2014).

The bottom line? An operating agreement may or may not be a common law contract. But that legal categorization may not matter for purposes of simple legal conclusions regarding the force and effect of operating agreements. A state’s LLC law may provide that LLCs are contracts or are to be treated as contracts in general or for specific purposes and may establish the circumstances in which operating agreements are valid, binding, and enforceable. However, in the absence of an applicable statute, the legal conclusion that an operating agreement is or is not a common law contract may matter in legal contexts that depend on the common law of contracts for their rules. In either case, the bar may want to participate in clarifying the status of operating agreements as binding commitments.

Any and all comments on the essay are welcomed.  Comments that decrease the length of the essay are especially appreciated, since I am admittedly over the allotted word limit. (These essays are meant to be very short pieces so that many of us can contribute to honoring Alan.)  Of course, there’s always time to write another, lengthier piece on this topic later, if there’s enough more to be said . . . .

Also, I will note that the Association of American Law Schools Section on Agency, Partnership, LLC’s and Unincorporated Associations is planning a program on the role of contract in LLCs at the 2016 annual meeting in January.  I have been asked to participate, and the panel promises to have some additional members that will attack the embedded issues from a number of interesting angles.  Stay tuned for more on that.

For those of you who teach agency (and the related concept of independent contractors) the following recent case example will make for a fun and culturally relevant example for many of your students.  

In March, 2015, the California Labor Commissioner’s Office issued an opinion finding that a  driver for the ride-hailing service mobile app company, Uber, should be classified as an employee, not an independent contractor.  The opinion details the control Uber exercised over the driver including setting the payment rates and terms, quality controls, service platforms, user communications, liability insurance requirements, and background checks all the while maintaining that drivers are independent contractors.  Citing to S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350-51, 769 P.2d 399 (1989), the Commission analyzed the following elements:

(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision;

(c) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;

(e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed;

(f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and

(h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.  

The Commission explained its finding that Plaintiff was an employee (not an independent contractor) (Commission Opinion, Berwick v. Uber, at 8)  with the following:

By obtaining the clients in need of the service and providing the workers to conduct it, Defendants retained all necessary control over the operation as a whole.  The party seeking to avoid liability has the burden of proving that persons whose services he has retained are independent contractors rather than employees.  In other words, there is a presumption of employment…..The modern tendency is to find employment when the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the employers, and when the worker, relative to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or professional service.

Id. at 8.

The Commission found that “Plaintiff’s work was integral to Defendants’ business…Without drivers such as Plaintiff, Defendants’ business would not exist.” Id.


Impact Discussion:

Many technology companies, like Uber, contend that their virtual marketplaces facilitate individuals acting as contractors, using their own possession to provide services for a personal profit. The argument is that this empowers workers giving them flexibility and freedom to set their own hours and success. A counter argument raised by labor activists and others is that this type of freelance work strips workers from certainty of wages and job status as well as other benefits of traditional employment such as health care, retirement and sick leave benefits. Opponents argue that what is being touted as good for individuals is just a means to minimize costs and increase corporate, not individual, profits. 

[Note, I have included this, along with a host of other case updates and teaching materials, in my new Business Organizations electronic casebook, available through ChartaCourse starting fall 2015.]

Edited on 7/10/15 to add:  colleague, friend and fellow blogger Haskell Murray suggested this article (How Crowd Workers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine) from The Nation on crowd-workers and the thought-provoking discussion on whether minimum wage laws should apply to these workers.  Joan Hemminway, same credentials above, noted that the Wall Street Journal Blog is also commenting on the Uber case.

 

-Anne Tucker

A recent unanimous decision from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Anson v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2015] UKSC 44, determined that a U.S. limited liability company (LLC) formed in Delaware will be treated for U.K. tax purposes as a partnership, and not a corporation. This is a good thing, as it provides the LLC members the ability to reap more completely the benefits of the entity’s choice of form.

What is not so good is that the court left unaddressed a lower court determination as follows, was quoted in para. 47: 

“Delaware law governs the rights of the members of [the LLC] as the law of the place of its incorporation, and the LLC agreement is expressly made subject to that law. However, the question whether those rights mean that the income of [the LLC] is the income of the members is a question of domestic law which falls to be determined for the purposes of domestic tax law applying the requirements of domestic tax law ….” (para 71) (emphasis added)

An LLC does not have a place of incorporation!  It has a place of formation.  Here is the link to Delaware’s Certificate of Formation, which is to be filed in accordance with the Limited Liability Company Act of the State of Delaware: https://corp.delaware.gov/llcform09.pdf. In contrast, you can find the Certificate of Incorporation, which is to be filed in accordance with the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, here: http://www.corp.delaware.gov/incstk.pdf

I’m glad the high U.K. court recognized that partnership taxation status can be proper for a U.S. LLC. But, just as You Can’t Pierce the Corporate Veil of an LLC Because It Doesn’t Have One, I wish they’d made clear that you can’t incorporate an LLC.  

I have been reading Paul Mahoney’s brilliant new book, Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails (University of Chicago Press 2015). You should too.

Mahoney attacks the traditional market failure rationale for our federal securities laws. He argues that contrary to the traditional narrative, market manipulation was not rampant prior to 1933 and the securities markets were operating reasonably well. Mahoney concludes that “‘lax’ regulation was not a substantial cause of the financial problems accompanying the Great Depression and . . . most (although not all) of the subsequent regulatory changes were largely ineffective and in some cases counterproductive.”

Mahoney looks at state blue sky laws, the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and, regrettably only briefly, the Investment Company Act. He concludes by discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts. He discusses the rationales for each regulation and whether those rationales are supported by the facts. Mahoney backs up his argument with a great deal of empirical research, some of which has appeared in earlier articles. Warning: Some of that discussion may be a little difficult for those without a background in regression analysis or financial economics, but you can follow Mahoney’s conclusions without understanding all of the analytical detail.

Mahoney’s work is a nice counterpoint to the narrative that prevails in most securities treatises and casebooks. Every law library should have a copy. Everyone interested in securities regulation policy, and certainly everyone who teaches a securities law course, should read this book. Whether or not you ultimately agree with Mahoney (as it happens, I generally do), his arguments must be dealt with.