WCU

Western Carolina University has posted an opening for an assistant professor of legal studies.  More information is available here. The position is fixed-term and non-tenure-track, though it comes with the title “assistant professor.” 

Last year, I greatly enjoyed my time presenting at Western Carolina University. WCU is in a beautiful part of the country, about an hour from Ashville, NC. WCU has a strong group of legal studies professors and has one of the nation’s few Business Administration and Law degrees at the undergraduate level.

I’ve updated my list of legal studies professor positions in business schools. Many of the positions have now been filled, but I placed the newer postings in bold font. 

Sergei Magnitsky. Remember that name any time you’re considering doing business in Russia or any other country in which the “rule of law” is a meaningless masquerade for the uncontrolled whims of the powerful.

Magnitsky was a young Russian accountant working for the Hermitage Capital Management firm created by Bill Browder to invest in Russia. When Browder stepped on the toes of some of the Russian business oligarchs, Magnitsky was thrown into prison, beaten, refused essential medical care, and basically murdered.

I learned Magnitsky’s story in a new book by Bill Browder, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man’s Fight for Justice. Browder created Hermitage Capital shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The book details Hermitage’s dramatic rise and, when Browder publicly fought the attempts by the Russian oligarchs to dilute his minority investments, Hermitage’s eventual fall. Browder and almost everyone else associated with Hermitage managed to flee Russia, some after being detained, but Magnitsky, the firm’s young accountant, refused to leave. When he was imprisoned and questioned, he refused to tell his captors the lies they wanted to hear, and his refusal eventually resulted in his death.

The story is captivating; the book reads like a novel. It’s also enlightening. I didn’t really understand the economic side of Putin’s Russia until I read this book. The word “corruption” only begins to describe what’s going on.

Red Notice has something for everyone. If you’re interested in the investment management business, if you’re interested in the rule of law, if you’re interested in investor rights, if you’re interested in modern Russia, or if you’re just interested in a well-told story, you will enjoy Browder’s book. I highly recommend it.

There’s been a lot of controversy recently over the SEC’s use – or perhaps I should say, non-use – of the automatic “bad actor” disqualifications for firms that commit securities violations.  The disqualification provisions place certain limits on the activities of firms that are found to have committed securities violations.  Dodd Frank added a big stick to the list of penalties:  It added an automatic disqualification from participating in private placements under Rule 506 of Regulation D.  It’s a severe penalty; private placements are extremely lucrative.

But the SEC can waive the automatic disqualification – and frequently does, even for “recidivist” firms that repeatedly rack up securities violations.  It imposes fines, perhaps outside monitoring, but it waives disqualifications – especially the Rule 506 disqualification.

The issue has recently hit the public eye because Democratic Commissioners Luis Aguilar and Kara Stein have been objecting to the grant of waivers to recidivist firms.  In their view, waivers are an important tool for deterring securities violations, and the SEC has improperly adopted a policy of granting them “reflexively.”

In light of all of this, the SEC has promised to issue guidelines as to how Rule 506 waiver decisions are made; Commissioner Daniel Gallagher thinks the matter may ultimately have to be resolved by Congress.

Until recently, hasn’t been clear just how often these waivers have been granted, and who has received them.  But Urska Velikonja just posted a new paper that gathered data on 201 waivers issued between 2003 and 2014.  These waivers involved Regulation D disqualification, Regulation A disqualification, and also disqualification from the use of automatic shelf registration statements to raise capital.  Velikonja finds that: (1) large financial firms received over 80% of the waivers; smaller firms and nonfinancial firms rarely receive them even though they are much more likely to be the target of an enforcement action; (2) the SEC typically does not offer any real justifications for its decision to grant or withhold a waiver, but the pattern appears to be that the Commission does not grant waivers for firms accused of offering fraud or issuer disclosure violations; usually, they’re granted for firms accused of unrelated misconduct, such as violations of the broker-dealer and investment adviser rules – presumably because the Commission views the latter firms as presenting a lower recidivism risk; and (3) the number of waivers has declined over time, and the SEC has recently begun utilizing partial waivers.

(More under the jump)

Continue Reading Bad actor waivers

Social enterprise has made two relatively recent appearances in the mainstream media:

(1) David Brooks on “How to Leave a Mark” in the NYT.

(2) George Roberts on “Bringing a Business Approach to Doing Good” in the WSJ.

In addition, a few law schools have started focusing more on social enterprise, including through the Georgetown Social Enterprise and Nonprofit Clinic and the Social Enterprise Law Association at Harvard Law School. 

Interest in social enterprise is and has been increasing, but the legal frameworks could still use significant work as my co-blogger Joan Heminway noted last month.

Ten days from now will mark the start of the 2015 NCAA men’s basketball tournament — one of the most watched sporting events of the year.   Recently, the NCAA sold 14 years worth of television broadcast rights to the NCAA Tournament for $10.8 Billion.  On an annual basis, that comes to an annual sum of  $770 Million per year.  

The athletes who play in these games, by contrast, do not receive any share of the derived revenues, nor are they allowed to endorse products or sign autographs for money.  In addition, the most successful teams in this tournament will have athletes that are required to miss upwards of nine class days based on a tournament schedule that is created to accommodate television broadcasts.

As a guest blogger for the month of March, I will be discussing the legal issues related to NCAA amateurism and the economic realities of the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.  Some of the topics I will discuss include why the NCAA is indeed an economic cartel, why the U.S. district court’s decision in O’Bannon v. NCAA does not go far enough to protect college athletes, why perhaps the National Labor Relations Board should grant college athletes the right to unionize, and how the NCAA men’s basketball tournament could be structured differently if student education, rather than athletic revenues, were truly a top priority.  

Thank you to Haskell Murray for providing me with this wonderful forum to share my ideas and scholarship.  And to all of the Business Law Prof Blog readers, please do not worry: I have no plans to be a Debbie Downer.  I will, however, talk seriously about the economic and legal realities of college sports and how we, as academics, can make a difference.

It’s always nice to be validated. Day two into torturing my business associations students with basic accounting and corporate finance, I was able to post the results of a recent study about what they were learning and why. “Torture” is a strong word– I try to break up the lessons by showing up to the minute video clips about companies that they know to illustrate how their concepts apply to real life settings. But for some students it remains a foreign language no matter how many background YouTube videos I suggest, or how interesting the debate is about McDonalds and Shake Shack on CNBC.

My alma mater Harvard Law School surveyed a number of BigLaw graduates about the essential skills and coursework for both transactional and litigation practitioners. As I explained in an earlier post, most of my students will likely practice solo or in small firms. But I have always believed that the skills sets are inherently the same regardless of the size of the practice or resources of the client. My future litigators need to know what documents to ask for in discovery and what questions to ask during the deposition of a financial expert. My family law and trust and estates hopefuls must understand the basics of a business structure if they wish to advise on certain assets. My criminal law aficionados may have to defend or prosecute criminal enterprises that are as sophisticated as any multinational corporation. Those who want to be legislative aides or go into government must understand how to close loopholes in regulations.

What are the top courses students should take? The abstract is below:

We report the results of an online survey, conducted on behalf of Harvard Law School, of 124 practicing attorneys at major law firms. The survey had two main objectives: (1) to assist students in selecting courses by providing them with data about the relative importance of courses; and (2) to provide faculty with information about how to improve the curriculum and best advise students. The most salient result is that students were strongly advised to study accounting and financial statement analysis, as well as corporate finance. These subject areas were viewed as particularly valuable, not only for corporate/transactional lawyers, but also for litigators. Intriguingly, non-traditional courses and skills, such as business strategy and teamwork, are seen as more important than many traditional courses and skills.

Did you take these courses? Has your school started adding more of this type of coursework and does your faculty see the value? Do you agree with the results of this survey? Let me know in the comments or email me at mnarine@stu.edu.

In response to my earlier post entitled “So . . . You Think You Want a Business Law Job . . . .,” a reader commented as follows:

I have also seen the shift of students in my college going from other areas of law into corporate law. . . . What advice in general would you offer up? Is it a good, secure job market to want to get into in this economy?

My initial response was that, ” . . . in general I would not suggest that anyone become a lawyer of any kind merely because it is a good job in this or any other economy. You should want to be a lawyer before venturing off to law school.”  

Bottom line: the market for business law or any other legal jobs is not a uniformly good, secure job market.  Law school is not and never has been a “job ticket” in any case.  But those who have a desire to be business lawyers and work intelligently and diligently at finding a job in business law typically will be business lawyers.  I undertook to post further this week.

So, what else shall I say to pre-law students and law students interested in business law?  I will be relatively brief here and in my posts for a number of weeks since I am typing with one hand (my left, non-dominant hand) due to a broken right wrist–an extra-articular distal radius, or Colles’, fracture.  But I invite further observations in the comments.

Continue Reading The Market for Business Law Jobs: What Does It Really Look Like?

The Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law recently published a March 6, 2014, lecture from Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steele, Continuity and Change in Delaware Corporate Law Jurisprudence (available on Westlaw, but fee may apply).  As an aside, I’ll note that it appears to have taken a full calendar year for this to get published (at least on Westlaw), which seems crazy to me.  If there’s any question why legal blogs can fill such a critical role in providing timely commentary on legal issues, this is a big part of the answer.

In the lecture, Chief Justice Steele discusses three main areas: (1) multi-forum jurisdiction, (2) shareholder activism, and (3) the Nevada, Delaware, and North Dakota Debate (a “competition for charters”). 

As to multi-forum jurisdiction, he makes the unsurprising point that Delaware courts are of the view that first impressions of the Delaware General Corporation Law or other “internal affairs doctrine” issues should be handled in Delaware courts.  Of note, he explains that the Delaware constitution (art. IV, § 11(8)) now allows federal courts, the top court from any state, the SEC, and bankruptcy courts to certify questions directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.  This option is one that lawyers litigating such cases in other forums won’t want to miss.    

With regard to shareholder activism, Chief Justice Steele states, 

In my preferred system for the world, and I think in the minds of all Delaware judges, engaged if not antagonistic stockholders add positive value as a check on director authority and are a catalyst for corrective accountability, so long as their efforts focus on improved performance and not the advancement of political or personal agendas–a major caveat in my view. Delaware courts, it seems to me, will increasingly recognize the benefits that engaged investors bring to the table.

This is an interesting take, and it seems consistent with my read of most Delaware law. I am of the view that shareholders should have a lot of latitude to engage and even agitate, if they wish, as long as they follow the rules they agreed to in the corporate charter and bylaws (and applicable state law, of course).  There is concern that a court might determine an action to be political or personal in nature if it something with which the court does not agree, but that could happen on the political left or right, and judgment is always a risk at some point.  Delaware courts are usually up to the task.
 
Chief Justice Steele’s view on this lends further credence to a view I have held since the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores decision came out: Delaware corporations cannot use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to justify their business decisions.  That is, RFRA applies in Delaware, but RFRA does not pre-empt Delaware corporations law, so RFRA cannot be used as a rationale for decision making, at least where a shareholder objects. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito wrote:
State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. See, e.g., ibid; id., §3:2; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, §351 (2011) (providing that certificate of incorporation may provide how “the business of the corporation shall be managed”). Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.
Combine this with Chief Justice Steele’s warning against company governance for the “advancement of political or personal agendas” and recent cases requiring Delaware corporation to seek profit, it seems Delaware courts are skeptical of non-profit-seeking rationales for shareholder or director action.  As Chancellor Chandler explained in eBay v. Newmark (more here):

The corporate form in which [an Delaware corporation] operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment. . . . Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, . . . directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.

Thus, in Delaware a for-profit corporation cannot promote or practice the religious views of even a majority of directors or shareholders where such actions do not promote the value of the corporation for shareholders. 

Finally, as to the Nevada, Delaware, North Dakota debate, Chief Justice Steele questions the value of Nevada allowing “charters to exculpate directors for breaches of duty of loyalty,” because he thinks such a massive change in widely held views of fiduciary duty law could invite federal “meddling.”  I think he’s exactly right on this.  He notes with skepticism the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act because there are only two companies that have adopted the law, but the law’s failure in the competition for charter does not raise the same concerns of a race to the bottom (my words) that Nevada’s law provides.

I think Chief Justice Steele’s article provides interesting and useful insight into the workings of the Delaware court system, and I recommend the sort read.  I just wish I had seen it about nine months ago.  

I finally got it together and opened an account on SSRN (I know, I know), and posted two of my forthcoming pieces there.

The first, Searching for Market Efficiency, is a very short comment that will be published in the Arizona Law Review, discussing Donald Langevoort’s Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market and Geoffrey Miller’s The Problem of Reliance in Securities Fraud Class Actions, both of which will be published in the same issue.  The comment discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Halliburton, and the reasons behind courts’ difficulties in defining market efficiency for the purpose of Section 10(b) class actions.

The second, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, is a longer article forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal, and it deals with the claim that, because corporate governance documents are “contractual,” clauses that require arbitration of shareholder disputes must be enforced according to their terms, as required by the Federal Arbitration Act.  I’ve discussed this topic before; the Article spins things out in more depth.  I will eventually put up a longer post here summarizing the piece, but if there’s anyone who just can’t wait for the cliffs notes version, well, you can now download it from SSRN.