Earlier, I posted a list of legal studies positions in business schools.

Today, I decided to go through the helpful PrawfsBlawg spreadsheet on hiring committees to draw out the law schools that listed at least one business law area of interest. The PrawfsBlawg spreadsheet is a few months old, so it is possible that the schools’ needs have changed somewhat in the interim. Also, many schools did not list any specific areas of interest, but hopefully this list is still helpful to our readers.

If readers know of any other law schools that have an interest in hiring in one or more business law areas, please leave the school name in the comments (with a link to the posting, if possible) or send me an email. Updated positions (that are not on the PrawfsBlawg list) will include a link to the posting, if possible. 

Updated 1/5/14

Alabama (business law)

Belmont (business law)

California Western (business associations)

Campbell (financial regulation)

Detroit Mercy (business law)

Florida A&M (business law)

Florida State (business law)

Fordham (international economic law)

Georgetown (transactional clinic, tenure track)

Loyola (Los Angeles) (associate clinical professor/director of business law practicum)

Maryland (business law)

North Carolina (corporate finance, international business transactions)

Northern Illinois (business law, securities law) – posted 12/23/14

UMKC (business law, entrepreneurship) 

West Virginia (entrepreneurship clinic)

Wyoming (business law)

I am back teaching law students again this semester, in addition to teaching business school students. Last class, I did my “mid-course” teaching evaluations in the law school, which I do voluntarily each semester to gauge how the courses are going for the students. Almost always, I pick up on some important trends from the responses. One somewhat frustrating thing, however, is that students often want contradicting things. (e.g., “the previous class review is extremely helpful” and “the previous class review is a complete waste of time.”)

The Lon Fuller quote below, from his article On Teaching Law, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 35, 42-43 (1950), helped me realize that some of the contradition, even within the same individual, is natural and expected.

Herein lies a dilemma for student and teacher. The good student really wants contradictory things from his legal education. He wants the thrill of exploring a wilderness and he wants to know where he stands every foot of the way. He wants a subject matter sufficiently malleable so that he can feel that he himself may help to shape it, so that he can have a sense of creative participation in defining and formulating it. At the same time he wants that subject so staked off and nailed down that he will feel no uneasiness in its presence and experience no fear that it may suddenly assume unfamiliar forms before his eyes.

 

No teacher is skillful enough to satisfy these incompatible demands. I don’t think he should try. Rather he should help the student to understand himself, should help him to see that he wants (and very naturally and properly wants) inconsistent things of his legal education. Much frustration will be avoided if the student realizes that an unresolved antinomy runs through his education, and that this antinomy cannot be resolved so long as men want of life, as they do of the preparation for life called education, both security and adventure.

For the second time, I have assigned my BA students to write their own shareholder proposals so that they can better understand the mechanics and the substance behind Rule 14-a8. As samples, I provided a link to over 500 proposals for the 2014 proxy season. We also went through the Apple Proxy Statement as a way to review corporate governance, the roles of the committees, and some other concepts we had discussed. As I reviewed the proposals this morning, I noticed that the student proposals varied widely with most relating to human rights, genetically modified food, environmental protection, online privacy, and other social factors. A few related to cumulative voting, split of the chair and CEO, poison pills, political spending, pay ratio, equity plans, and other executive compensation factors.

After they take their midterm next week, I will show them how well these proposals tend to do in the real world. Environmental, social, and governance factors (political spending and lobbying are included) constituted almost 42% of proposals, up from 36% in 2013, according to Equilar. Of note, 45% of proposals calling for a declassified board passed, with an average of 89% support, while only two proposals for the separation of chair and CEO passed. Astonishingly, Proxy Monitor, which looked at the 250 largest publicly-traded American companies, reports that just three people and their family members filed one third of all proposals. Only 4% of shareholder proposals were supported by a majority of voting shareholders.  Only one of the 136 proposals related to social policy concerns in the Proxy Monitor data set passed, and that was an animal welfare proposal that the company actually supported.

I plan to use two of the student proposals verbatim on the final exam to test their ability to assess whether a company would be successful in an SEC No-Action letter process. Many of the students thought the exercise was helpful, although one of the students who was most meticulous with the assignment is now even more adamant that she does not want to do transactional law. Too bad, because she would make a great corporate lawyer. I have 7 weeks to convince her to change her mind. 

Yesterday, I shared with my faculty during our teaching conversations* my research and thinking on gender equality in the classroom.  How do we handle gender in the classroom?  My guess is that most of us teaching honestly strive to achieve and believe that we create a gender-neutral, or more accurately an equally-facilitative classroom environment.  You can image the horror I felt when I received voluntary, anonymous student feedback last spring that said “you may not mean to or know you are doing this, but you treat men and women differently in class.”  From whose perspective was this coming?  How differently? And who gets the better treatment?  I was baffled. As a female law professor, I was hoping that I got a pass on thinking critically about gender because I am female, right?  Wrong. 

This feedback launched my research into the area and a self-audit of the ways in which I may be explicitly treating students differently, implicitly reinforcing gender norms, and unintentionally creating a classroom environment that is different from my ideal.

Below are some observations and discoveries about my own behavior and a summary of some relevant research. 

Continue Reading Gender in the Classroom

There is a growing drumbeat for banning laptops in the classroom, as a recent New Yorker article explained. The current case for banning laptops appeared on a Washington Post blog (among other places), in a piece written by Clay Shirky, who is a professor of media studies at New York University, and holds a joint appointment as an arts professor at NYU’s graduate Interactive Telecommunications Program in the Tisch School of the Arts, and as a Distinguished Writer in Residence in the journalism institute.

The piece makes a compelling case for banning laptops, and I agree there are a number of good reasons to do so.  I’ll not recount the whole piece here (I recommend reading it), but here’s a key passage:

Anyone distracted in class doesn’t just lose out on the content of the discussion but creates a sense of permission that opting out is OK, and, worse, a haze of second-hand distraction for their peers. In an environment like this, students need support for the better angels of their nature (or at least the more intellectual angels), and they need defenses against the powerful short-term incentives to put off complex, frustrating tasks. That support and those defenses don’t just happen, and they are not limited to the individual’s choices. They are provided by social structure, and that structure is disproportionately provided by the professor, especially during the first weeks of class.

I am sympathetic to this line of thinking, and I am even more sympathetic to another point made in the article: that the laptop distractions can leak from one student engaging in social media or other non-classroom activities to those around them. That is a serious concern. 

Still, I don’t ban laptops in my classes, though I have thought about it.  I let students use them in my larger-enrollment classes: Business Organizations, which usually is near the cap of 70, and Energy Law, which is usually in the 34-55 range. There is no doubt the risk of distraction in those courses is higher than in others.  Interestingly, in my last two seminar-style classes, I did not have a ban, either, but students rarely used laptops.  They opted-in for the discussions (self-selection for certain topics can certainly help on that front). 

I continue to think about how I want to proceed, but for now, I see value in allowing my students the option to choose how they wish to engage. There have been some other defenses of the idea of keeping laptops in the classroom (see, e.g.,  here), but my views are an amalgam of different styles and rationales.

First, part of learning, especially in becoming a life-long learner (which is what lawyers need to be), one must choose to engage. Law students are grown ups, and they must learn how they learn. They must decide.  I won’t be there when they get to their job and they have to use the computer to actually do the work of a lawyer.  They will, at some point, have to decide when to focus and when to play. 

Second, I value diversity of styles in the classroom.  That is, if most other professors are using open-book exams or take home exams, mine will probably be closed book, and closed note.  I have taught using quizzes, blog posts, midterms, short papers, etc., to add some variety to the experience.  Now that more classes, at least at my school, are without laptops, it actually gives me a reason to consider keeping them. 

Finally, at least so far, allowing laptops is part of my deal with students. It’s part of how I connect and model for them my view and expectation that they are grown ups.  I give them power, and I expect them to act appropriately.  As my friend, former colleague, and teaching mentor Patti Alleva (recognized as one of the nation’s best law teachers) explained in a recent National Law Journal piece, teaching is ultimately about respect and what she calls “intentionality.”  She explains:

The simple fact is that teaching does not always produce learning, even if thoughtfully done. Creating that causal link between the two can be a mystifying challenge, especially given the infinite number of unknowable factors and forces that may reduce a teacher’s effectiveness or a student’s willingness or ability to learn.

 . . . .

Teachers, as fiduciaries of their students’ educational experience, owe them compassionate deference, based on a benefit of the doubt, coupled with high but reasonable expectations for a meaningful learning collaboration.

. . . .

Ultimately, the best professors are themselves students who learn as much as they teach. And they seek, not to impose ideas on students, but to help equip them with the metacognitive tools to test those ideas and use them in service of problem-solving. Hopefully, students will develop their own senses of respect — for the legal profession, for themselves as aspiring lawyers and for the learning partnership we share. So, if years ago, in that tense seminar room, each of us left with respect for our disagreements and for the pedagogic processes that allowed us to critically and creatively examine, and grow from, those differences, then invaluable learning did take place that day with respect providing a bridge between teaching and learning when other things may have temporarily obscured the connection.

I hope that as teachers we can all appreciate that we, like our students, have different views on the best way to teach and to learn.  Just because we choose different paths, it doesn’t make any path wrong.  As long as the path is thoughtfully chosen, with a purpose and a goal, there’s a good chance it’s right for that teacher, in that moment, for that class.  And if it’s not, the key is not about dwelling on the mistake. It’s about learning, adjusting, and doing a better job next time, because the best teachers really are the ones who are trying to “learn as much as they teach.”  

Today, the Supreme Court DIG’d (dismissed as improvidently granted) the cert petition in the Section 11 case of IndyMac, which means we will not, at least for now, get resolution on the issue of whether American Pipe tolling applies to statutes of repose.

To be honest, I’m really not surprised.  The DIG was apparently in response to an announcement of a settlement of most of the IndyMac claims, but that’s a bit odd, since the parties all agreed that the settlement left alive enough claims to render the case not moot (specifically, the plaintiffs’ claims against Goldman Sachs would proceed if the plaintiffs prevailed before the Supreme Court). 

But as I previously posted, I think IndyMac was in an awkward procedural posture to begin with. Not because the split wasn’t real, but because the entire issue regarding the statute of repose was necessarily intertwined with prior unsettled issues regarding class action standing and the scope of Rule 15c.  Frankly, I can’t help but wonder if the Justices saw the settlement as an excuse to get rid of a bad grant, and they grabbed it.

That just leaves one, and possibly two, Section 11 cases for the Court to decide this Term.

 

In recent blog posts, two of my favorite bloggers, Keith Paul Bishop and Steve Bainbridge, have highlighted for our attention Delaware and California statutes providing (differently in each case) that an LLC and, at least in Delaware, its managers and members, are bound by the LLC’s operating agreement even if they do not sign that agreement.  Bishop notes in his post that the California “RULLCA creates an odd situation in which LLCs are bound by contracts that they did not execute and to which they seemingly are not parties.”  In his post Bainbridge cites to the Bishop post and another post by Francis Pileggi.  Certainly, they all have a point.  For students of contract law, the conclusion that a non-party is bound by a contract does not seem to be an obvious result . . . .

The flap in the blogosphere has its genesis in a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision, Seaport Village Ltd. v. Seaport Village Operating Company, LLC, et al. C.A. No. 8841-VCL.  The limited liability company defendant in that case raised as its only defense that it was not a party to the limited liability company agreement and therefore was not bound.  Unsurprisingly in light of applicable Delaware law, Chancellor Laster found the defense wanting as a matter of law.

This issue has more history than my brother bloggers point out, some of which is included in the brief Seaport Village opinion.  I probably don’t have all the details, but set forth below is some additional background information that may be useful in thinking about the binding nature of LLC operating agreements.  Others may care to fill in any missing information by leaving comments to this post.

Continue Reading More on LLCs as Non-Signatories of Operating Agreements . . .

The Delaware Supreme Court has held that fairness review in duty of loyalty cases has two elements: fair dealing and fair price. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (1983). Fair dealing focuses on process: questions such as “when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.” 457 A.2d at 711. Fair price focuses on the consideration paid or received in the transaction.

Weinberger says that the two elements of fairness must be considered together, that “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one between fair dealing and fair price.” Id. But, of course, damages will be measured against a fair price. If that’s the case, I ask my students, does fair dealing really make any difference as long as the price is fair?

A Delaware Court of Chancery opinion, In Re Nine Systems Corporation Shareholders Litigation,  (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014), recently dealt with that issue.  Vice Chancellor Noble concluded that the procedure followed by the company was unfair, so the element of fair dealing was not met. He decided that the price was fair but, considering the two elements together, decided that the burden of proving fairness had not been met.

Because of his finding that the price was fair, the Vice Chancellor rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for damages. However, he concluded that the court could require the defendants to pay certain of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs.

I now have an answer for my students. Even if the price is fair, fair dealing can still make a difference. Of course, I’m not sure anyone other than the plaintiffs’ attorneys will be terribly happy with the result.