The University of Oklahoma College of Law 

Hiring For Associate/Full Professor of Law 

The University of Oklahoma College of Law seeks outstanding applicants, entry-level or lateral, for up to three full-time tenure-track positions beginning fall 2023. We welcome candidates in all subject areas, with particular interest in filling curricular needs in tax, patents, wills & trusts, evidence, civil procedure, antitrust, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 

OU Law is a high-quality, affordable, and forward-looking institution committed to developing a socially-involved and inclusive legal profession. We boast world-class facilities and a diverse student body. Our strong national reputation is buttressed by a commitment to attracting and supporting excellent faculty with summer research grants, publication placement bonuses, course reductions based on productivity, and an extraordinary number of endowed positions.

Our law school sits on the main OU campus in Norman, a university town alive with entertainment, arts, food, and sports. A perennial “best place to live,” Norman has excellent public schools and low cost-of-living. Neighboring Oklahoma City features a dynamic economy, outstanding cultural venues, and a major airport. Visit http://www.ou.edu/flipbook and http://soonerway.ou.edu for more information.

Qualifications

  1. Must have a J.D. or equivalent academic degree.
  2. Must have strong academic credentials.
  3. Must have a commitment to excellence in teaching and demonstrably outstanding potential for scholarship.

Application Instructions

To apply, please submit a CV and job-talk paper to oulawhiring@ou.edu. Cover letter optional. If selected for an interview, teaching evaluations will be requested if available. Application review will begin immediately, and the positions will remain open until filled.

Equal Employment Opportunity Statement

The University of Oklahoma, in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations, does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, genetic information, gender identity, gender expression, age, religion, disability, political beliefs, or status as a veteran in any of its policies, practices, or procedures. This includes, but is not limited to: admissions, employment, financial aid, housing, services in educational programs or activities, or health care services that the University operates or provides.

Diversity Statement

The University of Oklahoma is committed to achieving a diverse, equitable and inclusive university community by recognizing each person’s unique contributions, background, and perspectives. The University of Oklahoma strives to cultivate a sense of belonging and emotional support for all, recognizing that fostering an inclusive environment for all is vital in the pursuit of academic and inclusive excellence in all aspects of our institutional mission.

Abortion is obviously one of our most divisive political issues. Thus, when corporate leaders make decisions related to abortion laws, such as moving out of a pro-life state (see, e.g., CEO: Duolingo will move operations should Pennsylvania ban abortion), a specter of political bias is arguably raised. One normative question that then arises is whether such a decision is sufficiently conflict-prone to warrant enhanced scrutiny, as I have argued here. There is certainly a shareholder-wealth-maximization case to be made for moving out of a pro-life state — specifically, the argument that high-value employees demand such action. But this determination should be supported by something more than trending Twitter comments or the personal biases of decision-makers. Corporate fiduciaries are required to consider all material information reasonably available, and where decision-making is sufficiently prone to conflicts of interest the accountability concerns of corporate governance should trump its protection of discretion.

As a perhaps related aside, one may compare the argument against state universities having official positions on whether the Constitution should be read as protecting abortion. As Prof. Leslie Johns noted in an e-mail she sent to the UCLA Chancellor following his related public statement asserting that Dobbs “is antithetical to the University of California’s mission and values” (via The Volokh Conspiracy here):

As a faculty member in both the political science department and the Law School, I feel compelled to remind you that Americans (and even Californians) have diverse and complicated viewpoints on the issue of abortion. The legal issues involved in the recent US Supreme Court ruling cannot be simply reduced to a statement about restrictions on “women’s reproductive rights.”

Abortion is not a simple matter of access to health care. It is a complex moral and political question that involves balancing fundamental rights to life and physical autonomy. By denying this reality, you are asserting a political position. Yet your employment as a public employee explicitly prohibits you from using your office for political purposes. It is both inappropriate and illegal for you (and for me) to use our official capacity to make claims that specific abortion policies or constitutional interpretations are “antithetical to the University of California’s mission and values.”

Given UCLA’s professed commitment to “diversity, equity, and inclusion,” I respectfully ask you to carefully consider the implications of declaring that a conservative viewpoint is “antithetical to the University of California’s mission and values.”

Last year, several BLPB posts focused on the GameStop market event (for example, here, here, here, here, and here). For BLPB readers with continuing interest in this topic, I wanted to flag that yesterday, a report prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives was released: Game Stopped: How the Meme Stock Market Event Exposed Troubling Business Practices, Inadequate Risk Management, and the Need for Legislative and Regulatory Reform.  I look forward to reviewing the report in more detail!

[revised]

 

In August 2021, the SEC announced that it had charged Matthew Panuwat with insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Panuwat was the head of business development at Medivation, a mid-sized biopharmaceutical company when he learned that his company was set to be acquired by Pfizer at a significant premium.

If Panuwat had purchased Medivation stock in advance of the announcement of the acquisition, it is likely he would have been liable for insider trading under the classical theory. Liability for insider trading under the classical theory arises when a firm issuing stock, its employees, or its other agents strive to benefit from trading (or tipping others who then trade) that firm’s stock based on material nonpublic information. Here the insider (or constructive insider) violates a fiduciary duty to the counterparty to the transaction (the firm’s current or prospective shareholders) by not disclosing the information advantage drawn from the firm’s material nonpublic information in advance of the trade.

If Panuwat had purchased shares of Pfizer in advance of the announcement, then it is likely he would have been liable under the misappropriation theory. Liability for insider trading under the misappropriation theory arises when one misappropriates material nonpublic information and trades (or tips another who trades) on it without first disclosing the intent to trade to the information’s source. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997), the “misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information” by duping them out of “the exclusive use of that information.”

But Panuwat did not trade in either Medivation or Pfizer. Instead, he purchased stock options in Incyte, another pharmaceutical company that was similar in size and market focus to Medivation. According to the SEC’s litigation release, “Panuwat knew that investment bankers had cited Incyte as a comparable company in discussions with Medivation and he anticipated that the acquisition of Medivation would likely lead to an increase in Incyte’s stock price.” Panuwat’s gamble paid off. Incyte’s stock price increased 8% when Pfizer’s acquisition of Medivation was announced. Panuwat earned $107,066 from his trade.

Panuwat moved to dismiss the SEC’s insider trading charges, arguing that his trading in the shares of an unrelated third-party issuer did not violate any recognized theory of insider trading liability.  While the district court acknowledged this was a case of first impression, it denied Panuwat’s motion and permitted the SEC to proceed with its first enforcement action under the “shadow trading” theory of insider trading liability.

The principal basis for the court’s decision seems to be that Panuwat’s trading arguably violated the misappropriation theory by breaching the broad terms of Medivation’s insider trading policy, which includes the following language:

During the course of your employment…with the Company, you may receive important information that is not yet publicly disseminated…about the Company. … Because of your access to this information, you may be in a position to profit financially by buying or selling or in some other way dealing in the Company’s securities…or the securities of another publicly traded company, including all significant collaborators, customers, partners, suppliers, or competitors of the Company. … For anyone to use such information to gain personal benefit is illegal.

To me, the most interesting question raised by the Panuwat case, and the problem of shadow trading more generally, is why would Medivation (or any company) adopt such a broadly worded insider trading policy? How did this broad proscription on employee trading benefit Medivation’s shareholders?

Medivation’s shareholders could not have been harmed by Panuawat’s trading. Such trading could not affect Medivation’s stock price, nor could it put the acquisition in jeopardy. So why is the blanket proscription against trading in “another publicly traded company” in the policy at all? The final sentence of the policy as quoted above suggests that the drafters were under the impression that such trading would be illegal under the securities laws. This may be true under the misappropriation theory, but only because Medivation chose to make it so by including the language in the policy. What if Medivation’s policy had instead provided something like the following language:

Because of your access to this information, you may be in a position to profit financially by trading in the Company’s securities, or the securities of its customers and suppliers. Such trading is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this policy should, however, be read as prohibiting your trading or dealing in any other issuers’ securities unless expressly restricted by the Company.

Under this policy, the SEC would have had no basis for the charge that Panuwat’s trading violated the misappropriation theory. In other words, it is entirely up to issuers whether they want to expose themselves and their employees to “shadow trading” liability. But if such exposure to liability does not benefit an issuer’s own shareholders, it can only hurt them (by needlessly exposing the company’s employees and the company itself to direct or derivative insider trading liability). So what business justification is there for issuers to include the broader language in their insider trading compliance policies? I hope readers will offer their thoughts in the comments below.

In February 2021, Samuel Gregg argued (here) that: “To expect the rest of the world simply to accept whatever stakeholder-corporatist insiders have decided to be the new global consensus on any given topic seems disconcertedly utopian. It also increases the possibility of more populist backlashes on an international level.”

Yesterday, George Will published an op-ed in the Washington Post that appears to capture some more of this sentiment. You should go read the whole thing (here), but here is a brief excerpt:

The New York Times recently interviewed two advocates of ESG investing. One said, in effect, that only such investing fulfills fiduciary obligations because the welfare of those whose money is being used depends on “a planet that is livable.” Meaning: Politically enlightened ESG advocates know what unenlightened investors would want if they were as intelligent and virtuous as the advocates. The other ESG enthusiast the Times interviewed said “social justice investing” is “the deep integration of four areas: racial, gender, economic and climate justice.” And the “single-issue CEO” — the kind focused on maximizing shareholders’ value — is “not the way of the future.” This is often the progressives’ argument-ending declaration: Non-progressives are on the wrong side of history, so they can be disregarded until history discards them. The Times’s interviewer observed that “defining justice seems messy these days.” These days? Actually, justice has been a contested concept since Plato wrote. For today’s ESG advocates, however, the millennia-long debate is suddenly over: Justice is 2022 American progressivism, period.

Courtesy of friend-of-the-BLPB Bernie Sharfman, I am linking to his coauthored (with James Copland) comment letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the climate change rule-making proposal.  The letter includes copious footnotes.  As with other comment letters that have been written on the substance of the SEC proposal, there are some interesting definitional questions on which intelligent folks disagree.  E.g., what is included under the umbrella of investor protection?  What regulation promotes “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”?  These all are among the big picture issues on which the SEC has the opportunity to speak.  I expect thoughtful responses.

NBLS2022(OULawPhoto)

Having just come back from the first in-person National Business Law Scholars Conference since 2019 (at The University of Oklahoma College of Law, pictured here), I have many thoughts swirling through my head.  I always love that conference.  The people, whom I dearly missed, are a big part of that. And Megan Wischmeier Shaner was an awesome planning committee host. But the ideas that were shared . . . .  Wow. So many great research projects were shared by these wonderful law teachers and scholars!  Over time, I hope to share many of them with you.  

But for today, I want to focus on one thing that I heard in a few presentations at the conference: that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is and always has been the be-all and end-all of corporate purpose and board decision making. I am posting on that topic today not only because of my engagement with the conference, but also because the issue is implicated in Ann’s post on Saturday (Bathrooms are About Stakeholders) and by Stefan’s post yesterday (ESG & Communism?). I want to focus on a part of Stefan’s post (and Stefan, you may that issue with my remarks here, based on your response in the comments to your post), but I promise to work in a reference to Ann’s post, too, along the way.

Like Paul, I am somewhat troubled by the connections made in abstract for the article featured in Stefan’s post—albeit perhaps for different reasons. I will read the article itself at some point to learn more about the issues relating to the Fed. And I agree with Stefan’s commentator Paul that the Elizabeth Warren reference in the abstract is a bit of a stalking horse. I want to address here, then, only the asserted corroboration of an “incipient trend” offered as an aside at the end of the abstract excerpted in Stefan’s post.

As readers may know from my published work and commentary on the BLPB, I do not accept that there is a legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth embedded in corporate law. (Articles have pointed out that the shareholder wealth maximization mantra has not existed consistently over the course of corporate history, but I will leave commentary on that literature for another day.) Regardless, to be sustainable, a corporation must make profit that inures to the benefit of shareholders, while also understanding and being responsive to the corporation’s other shareholder commitments—commitments that may vary from corporation to corporation. But that does not mean that the board must maximize shareholder wealth, especially in each and every board decision. (Let’s leave Revlon duties aside, if you would, for these purposes.). It also does not mean that shareholder wealth is properly ignored in corporate decision making, but in my experience, few firms actually completely ignore short-term and long-term effects on shareholder wealth in making decisions.

In essence, the standard shareholder wealth maximization trope would have us believe that the board’s task is too simple, as I have noted in some of my work. A compliant, functional board engaged in corporate decision making first needs to understand as well as it can the firm’s business and the markets in which the firm operates and then needs to assess in that context how the corporation should proceed. Some of the board’s decisions may require it taking a stand on what have (regrettably, imv) become highly politicized social justice and commercial issues. It involves weighing and balancing. It is hard work. But that is the board’s job. The board may want to inform itself of which political party likes what (especially as it relates to its various constituencies), but the board’s decisions ultimately need to be made in good faith on the basis of what, after being fully informed in all material respects, they collectively believe to be in the best interest of the corporation (including its shareholders).

Some folks seem to ignore that reality. Instead, they assume (in many cases without adequate articulated foundation) that a board is catering to or rejecting, e.g., ESG initiatives based on a political viewpoint. I have more faith in corporate boards than that. I urge people to check those assumptions before making them (and to leave their own political preferences behind in doing so). Although I have seen a few dysfunctional boards in my 37 years as a lawyer and law professor, I have seen many more that are looking out for the long-term sustainability of the firm for the financial and other benefit of shareholders. That does require that employee interests, customer/client interests, and the interest of other stakeholders be understood and incorporated into the board’s decision making. Ann seems to agree with this last point when she writes in her post that: “despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, it may very well be profit-maximizing to bow to employee demands; it doesn’t mean the CEO is pursuing a personal political agenda, it simply means that restive employees make a company difficult to run.”

In concluding, I do not see an “incipient trend” or any “diametric opposition” of the kind noted in the abstract posted by Stefan. I also see board (and overall corporate management) support for ESG—although I admittedly am not a fan of looking at all the E, S, and G together—as the probable acknowledgement of an economic or financial reality in or applicable to those firms. Economies and markets are changing, and firms that do not respond to those changes one way or another will not survive. And that will not inure to the benefit of shareholders or other corporate stakeholders. The Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation acknowledges the importance of corporations in our local, national, and global economies and, in light of that, articulates management’s recognition of the need to create sustainable economic and financial symbiosis through the firm’s decision making: “Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our country.”

As scholars, we should recognize the realities of the boardroom and of firm management in general, which optimally involve complex, individualized decision-making matrices. Moreover, as we theorize about, and assess the policy objectives of, the laws we study and on which we comment, we should keep those realities in mind. Rather than assuming why boards (and C-suite officers, for that matter) act the way they do based on our theoretical and political viewpoints, we should interrogate their management decisions thoroughly, understanding and critiquing the actual bases for those decisions and, when possible, suggesting a “better way.”

Thanks to the National Business Law Scholars Conference participants for their stimulating presentations and to Ann and Stefan for their posts. I hope that this post serves to illuminate my perspective on shareholder wealth maximization a bit. The conversation is important, even if a common understanding may not be forthcoming.

Joel Slawotsky has published The Impact of Geo-Economic Rivalry on U.S. Economic Governance: Will the United States Incorporate Aspects of China’s State-Centric Governance?, 16 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 559 (2022). An excerpt:

China’s corporate governance model emphasizes an extensive governmental role in the construction of economic markets. The paradigm consists of an economic-political syndicate of collaborative actors creating profit but whose critical core mission is to advance state objectives as defined by the ruling authority, the CCP. Economic interests thus serve political interests pursuant to a template of state direction and partnership with the private sector encompassing share ownership; industrial policies; governmental representatives embedded in the private sector; and discipline imposed for failing to comply with syndicate rules…. [S]ome in the U.S. political establishment are in favor of more governmental control to prevent corporate abuse …. To a remarkable degree, the dissatisfaction is already being manifested by attempts to engender greater government involvement in U.S. central bank policy by expanding the Federal Reserve’s (“the Fed”) mandate to encompass a wider spectrum of goals to address social justice objectives…. Moreover, efforts to expand the Fed’s mandate to encompass social goals should also be viewed in the context of proposals to embrace a model which modifies the existing U.S. capitalist framework. For example, Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act calls for employees of large firms to elect forty percent of all board members. Further corroborating this incipient trend is the fact that the CEOs of some of the largest U.S. businesses have declared their disagreement with the “shareholder-value” model, opining that a corporation’s purpose is far more extensive and embraces many stakeholders. Such a view is diametrically opposite to long-standing U.S. economic governance. Another indication of a more state-centric economic model is the popularity of environmental, social, and governance (ESG).

Id. at 559, 578-79.

Recently, the New York Times reported that Howard Schultz wants to rescind the open bathroom policy that Starbucks adopted in 2018.   The backstory, as some may remember, is that two black men in Philadelphia were waiting to meet someone in a Starbucks and they sought to use the bathroom without buying anything.  A store employee ended up calling the cops; they were arrested; protests ensued; and the company announced that anyone would be permitted to use Starbucks bathrooms going forward.

Now, however, Schultz is reconsidering that policy.  Here’s what he said about it:

We serve 100 million people at Starbucks, and there is an issue of just safety in our stores in terms of people coming in who use our stores as a public bathroom, and we have to provide a safe environment for our people and our customers. And the mental health crisis in the country is severe, acute and getting worse.

Today, we went to a Starbucks community store in Anacostia, five miles from here, which is a community that unfortunately is emblematic of communities all across the country that are disenfranchised, left behind. And here’s Starbucks building a store for the community. Now, we had a round-table discussion with the manager and other people, and we were told that from 12 to 6 p.m. today — every day — there’s no one on the street. Why? Because people are afraid that their children are going to get shot — five miles from the White House.

I think we’ve got to provide better training for our people. We have to harden our stores and provide safety for our people. I don’t know if we can keep our bathrooms open.

Starbucks is trying to solve a problem and face a problem that is the government’s responsibility.

Let’s remember why the open-bathroom policy was adopted in the first place.  I, for one, used Starbucks bathrooms for years without buying anything, well before 2018.  That’s because a customer-only bathroom policy doesn’t actually mean that only customers can use the bathroom; it is, in practical effect, a policy of employee discretion, via selective enforcement.  Some people who are not customers can use the bathroom, and some cannot.  In general, we can surmise it will be black non-customers who are asked to leave; white non-customers will be permitted to go.  Perhaps some degree of employee training may mitigate the racial impact of a closed-bathroom policy, but it’s unlikely to eliminate it entirely.  So, Starbucks opened up its bathrooms.

Still, let’s assume Schultz is right, and the open-bathroom policy does, in fact, attract some people who are actual threats to Starbucks employees. 

That means Starbucks has to balance stakeholder interests.  Does it favor the employees and their safety?  Or does it recognize the disparate racial impact of a closed-bathroom policy, and favor the public interest of keeping them available?  

Right now, Starbucks is fighting off a union campaign; very likely, the profit-maximizing strategy is to favor the employees.  This article, for example, reports safety as a key issue surrounding union organization. 

This illustrates a couple of things.  First, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, it may very well be profit-maximizing to bow to employee demands; it doesn’t mean the CEO is pursuing a personal political agenda, it simply means that restive employees make a company difficult to run.  Second, as is often mentioned when stakeholder-governance is discussed, not all stakeholders have the same interests, and favoring some groups may wind up disfavoring others (which is one of the reasons shareholder primacists argue stakeholder governance is impractical; absent that profit-maximization decision rule, there’s no obvious way to choose among stakeholders).

But now, let’s complicate the narrative.

Is employee safety really Schultz’s motivation here?  Starbucks does not have a janitorial staff; part of the job of being a barista is cleaning, including cleaning the bathrooms.  I assume an open-bathroom policy means there is simply more work, and more unpleasant work, for the baristas.  It wouldn’t at all surprise me if the union organizing campaign does not just include safety discussions, but also the question whether baristas should receive more pay, or more benefits, or whether stores should simply hire more staff, to deal with that extra work.  Schultz, by closing the bathrooms, placates the employees on this point but also avoids additional expenditures by the company.

If that’s the real story here – and I don’t know that it is, I’m speculating – then what essentially is going on is that Starbucks’s original policy had a disparate racial impact, and remedying that problem is expensive.  Schultz would rather just leave the racism in place; it’s cheaper.

That’s definitely a shareholder primacist approach, but it’s one where the company profits by externalizing the costs of doing business on to the public.  And in particular, black members of the public.

Today’s press release from Prof. Lawrence Cunningham states in part:

Twenty-two of the nation’s leading professors of law and finance today wrote the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to renew their doubts about the agency’s authority to adopt a new far-reaching climate disclosure regime and to urge an immediate withdrawal of the proposal. Initially writing in response to the SEC’s proposed rule requiring U.S. public companies to create and disclose extensive information on greenhouse gas emissions, the professors submitted a public letter in April questioning the authority of a federal financial regulator to collect climate-related information and identifying numerous reasons the proposal may face a challenge in federal courts. Since then, the debate has been joined by a number of other professors who have submitted letters supporting the SEC’s authority. In the letter filed today, the professors weigh these arguments and explain their contrary conclusion.

The full comment letter can be found here. A relevant excerpt:

[T]he clear purpose (and certain effect) of these disclosures is to give third parties information for use in their campaigns to reduce corporate emissions, regardless of the effect on investors…. Imposing substantial costs on some companies to prepare for a “potential transition to a lower carbon economy” that Congress has not and may never mandate will harm investors who prioritize financial returns over social goals…. As Commissioner Peirce’s dissenting statement put it, the Proposal will put the SEC’s weight behind “an array of non-investor stakeholders” demanding changes in company operations. We believe, however, that the SEC and the courts can and should consider predictable consequences when deciding whether the Proposal will protect investors and whether it involves a “major question” that Congress should decide. Only by ignoring the long and contentious history of debates over the appropriate policy response to climate change could one conclude that the Proposal is a mere “business as usual” tweak to the disclosure system.

UPDATED: Another worthwhile excerpt:

An analysis of the SEC’s authority to adopt the Proposal must grapple with the substantial differences between it and the 2010 Guidance. Here we find helpful a framework set out in the Coates Letter, which distinguishes disclosures about the impact of climate on a company with disclosures about the impact of a company on the climate. This is a simple rubric for separating disclosures focused on investor protection from those focused on social goals. The Proposal manifestly requires the second type of disclosure. A core element of the Proposal, one highlighted in the SEC’s Fact Sheet accompanying the Proposal, is disclosure of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. This is a quintessential measure of a company’s contribution to climate change. It is not a measure of the impact of climate change on the company.