October 2025

Back to the bottomless well…

I’ve previously commented on the items up for a shareholder vote next week, Mike Levin and I recorded a Shareholder Primacy podcast about it, and I also spoke about it on Fordham’s Bite Sized Business Law podcast. The proposal that really has my attention is Proposal 3, which would amend Tesla’s 2019 stock compensation plan to do two things: First, to create a reserve of shares for the board to award Elon Musk to replace his 2018 pay package, if the Delaware Supreme Court affirms Chancellor McCormick’s rescission of that package. And second, to authorize Tesla shares to pay other employees, just as part of a normal stock compensation plan. One thing I highlighted on the Shareholder Primacy podcast – and has become a focus of objection by multiple shareholders – is that these two very different proposals are bundled together in a single vote to amend the 2019 compensation plan. That is, if you want to allow Tesla to pay its employees in stock, but you don’t want to restore Elon Musk’s 2018 pay package, there isn’t an option for that; you can have both, or neither.

Is that …

Here is Novo Nordisk’s bid for Metsera. Because the deal requires prolonged regulatory clearance, Novo will buy nonvoting convertible shares from Metsera, with the cash to be paid as a dividend to Metsera’s shareholders now. Since the convertibles are nonvoting, no regulatory preclearance is required, and cash gets to Metsera right away. Before NN can convert to voting and take over the company, it has to obtain regulatory clearance.

Which sounds fine except for how this looks a lot like what DOJ called an evasion of antitrust law just a few years ago with Toshiba and Canon.

Here, the parties might argue that this structure is not solely to evade preclearance, as it was there – it’s also to give assurances to Metsera in the context of a contested takeover battle, and meet contractual requirements to qualify as a superior offer. 

Maybe that wins the day but it’s why, I guess, Pfizer says this is an “illusory” offer and Metsera may not terminate the current agreement.

If I’m getting this wrong, though, someone let me know so I can edit/delete and bury my shame. (Commenting doesn’t seem to work well here but feel free to email).

The William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa invites applications for a tenure-track faculty position in Business Law to begin in Fall 2026. We seek candidates with a demonstrated record or strong potential for excellence in teaching, scholarship, and service.

We welcome applicants whose research and teaching interests include business associations, corporate law, commercial law, securities regulation, entrepreneurship, or related areas. The successful candidate will join a collegial and interdisciplinary faculty committed to teaching excellence, community engagement, and advancing justice in Hawaiʻi and beyond.
 
Applications must be submitted through the University of Hawaiʻi’s official Work at UH portal.

For full consideration, please apply by November 12, 2025.
 
For inquiries, please contact Professor Alina Ng Boyte at aboyte@hawaii.edu.

Back in June of 2024, in connection with the legislative debate in Delaware over the approval of § 122(18) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL § 122(18)), I authored a blog post in which I raised concerns about whether there was adequate understanding of the public policy impacts of the proposal to adopt DGCL § 122(18).  I then wrote:

I have one large and important question as Senate Bill 313 continues to move through the Delaware legislative process: do members of the Delaware General Assembly voting on this bill fully understand the large shift in public policy represented by the introduction of DGCL § 122(18)?  If so, then they act on an informed basis and live with the consequences, as they do with any legislation they pass that is signed into law.  If not, we all must work harder to enable that understanding.

Later that month, I authored and published a second blog post that cross-referenced the earlier blog post and offered several policy-related values relevant to the proposal.

Two-and-a-half weeks ago, I found myself affected by similar concerns about the need for serious, thoughtful policy engagement in Delaware.  The occasion was the Gala Celebration

Although not much time has passed since I put out updated tables for Nevada and Texas on October 9, I’ve found another four reincorporations to Nevada recently, so I’ve updated these tables below. In the interest of making this readable, I’ve dropped the tables at the bottom and covered the stated rationales at the top.

The four recent firms announcing moves or attempts to move to Nevada include: (1) Oblong, Inc.; (2) HWH International Inc.; (3) Twin Vee PowerCats, Co.; and (4) Digital Brands Group, Inc. In terms of market capitalization, these are all nano-cap firms with market capitalizations under $50 million. Digital Brands Group is larger than the remainder combined with a market capitalization of roughly $38 million. This is a group where cost concerns about franchise taxes may be more material.

The stated rationales cover franchise tax costs, litigation risk environments, transaction planning, books and records actions, and potential D&O savings. As I am reading more of these proxies, I’m also beginning to develop concerns that not every firm reincorporating to Nevada has consulted with a Nevada lawyer about Nevada law. I’ve added some mild finger wagging to try to help.

Before discussing these, I want to drop

Look, I get why courts are hesitant to allow securities fraud plaintiffs to state a claim based on false pretensions to corporate “ethics.” Courts fear this would cast too wide a net; Matt Levine’s “everything is securities fraud” would become literally true if any kind of corporate misconduct rendered an ethical code “false,” such that the code itself becomes a violation of Section 10(b). And that, as I have previously written, erodes the line between state law governance claims, and federal law fraud claims.

Still, I find it maddening when courts choose to dismiss these kinds of claims on the ground that ethical codes must be puffery because they are required by regulators. For example, the court in Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D. Colo. 2007), “A company’s essentially mandatory adoption of a code of ethics simply does not imply that all of its directors and officers are following that code of ethics. In fact, the mandatory nature of the adoption of such a code makes clear that all public companies—whether run by crooks or angels—will adopt just such a code.”

May I make the radical suggestion that the fact that

I spoke to Law.com about the potential switch to semi-annual reporting, and one of the questions I was asked concerned securities fraud risk – more? less?

Answer: it’s complicated.

On the one hand, fewer statements means fewer potentially false statements, and so fewer opportunities for someone to bring a lawsuit over what you say.

On the other hand, probably a lot of companies will continue to speak to the market – and even voluntarily disclose quarterly earnings. Except, they may not include all of the details that a 10-Q would include. Depending on what they choose to disclose, and whether they change their practices over time, there might be some vulnerability to a charge of misleading half-truths/omissions.

Additionally, semi-annual reporting means the market will be receiving less information on the company, and the information it does receive may come as a surprise, resulting in more volatility. Surprise information, coupled with a big price movement, is the stuff securities fraud actions are made of. Fewer disclosures means fewer opportunities to telegraph changed expectations and slow walk the stock in a particular direction.

But on the other hand! Securities fraud actions live or die by the event study – proof that

We’re at about two months since the last update on this front, and I wanted to share my current chart for 2025. As always, if you know about any moves that I’ve missed, please reach out.

I’ve got updated charts, differences of opinion about how well-developed Nevada’s case law is, some highlights and confusion about the Glass Lewis blog post on reincorporation that dropped today, and a quick highlight of the Guess, Inc. proxy that revealed its board had voted to attempt to move to Nevada before a take-private offer arrived.

Nevada

Nevada had another two public companies announce attempts to move to Nevada, Algorhythm Holdings and Capstone Holding.

2025 Nevada Domicile Shifts
 FirmResultNotes
 1.Fidelity National FinancialPass 
 2.MSG SportsPass 
 3.MSG EntertainmentPass 
 4.Jade BiosciencesPassJade merged with Aerovate.
 5.BAIYU HoldingsPassAction by Written Consent
 6.RobloxPass 
 7.Sphere EntertainmentPass 
 8.AMC NetworksPass 
 9.Universal Logistics Holdings, Inc.PassAction by Written Consent
 10.Revelation BiosciencesFail97% of votes cast were for moving.  There “were 1,089,301 broker non-votes regarding this proposal”
 11.Eightco Holdings*
FailVotes were 608,460 in